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Abstract
Both the duration of and generosity of Unemployment Insurance (UI) payment increased
substantially during the Great Recession. This paper attempts to quantify the separate effects of
two of the changes affected by the program during this process: multiple extensions of the maximum
benefit spells, and the increase in the dollar benefit levels, using administrative data from Kentucky
for the period January 2006 through December 2011.
In the first chapter, I estimate Rothstein (2011) specifications, and introduce a variety
alternative hazard models to estimate the effect of the multiple extensions on reemployment. My
estimates suggest that extensions of UI spells lowered monthly exit hazards by 1 percent, and
extended the unemployment duration by 0.4 weeks. My estimates imply that a fair fraction of the
persistent increase in long-term unemployment after the Great Recession is due to a decline in UI
recipients’ search efforts.
In the second chapter, I identify the effect of the benefit level in the Regression Kink Design
(RKD) using kinks in the schedule of UI benefits, and find the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to the benefit level ranges from 0.2 to 0.6. My results suggest that given the massive
extensions of the benefit weeks, unemployed workers responded to benefit level changes less than
without the multiple extensions of benefit weeks.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Extended UI
Eligibility on the Duration of
Unemployment
1.1 Introduction
Over the course of the Great Recession, the national unemployment rate rose from 6% in the
middle of 2008 to almost 10% in the latter months of 2009. Although the recession ended officially in
June 2009, unemployment remained stubbornly high, and the unemployment rate did not fall below
9% until January 2012, over two years after the Great Recession ended. Even more strikingly, the
long-term unemployment rate1 reached much higher levels (45.5%, the historic high) which persisted
much longer in the Great Recession than in any previous period since the late 1940s. While the
unemployment rate slowly receded after the peak of about 12%, the long-term unemployment rate
remained staggeringly high at more than 39%2, and the mean durations of unemployment reached
40 weeks (historic high) in June 2010, one year after the Great Recession ended as indicated in
Figure 1.1. The persistence of high long-term unemployment is a cause for concern regarding the
multiple extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) that provided up to 99 weeks of unemployment
1The long-term unemployment rate is defined as the share of the unemployed who have been out of work for 27
weeks (six months) or more.
2The highest level in the history was 26%
1
Figure 1.1: U.S. Unemployment Rate and Unemployment Durations
benefits to qualified unemployed workers in most states.
During normal periods, UI programs in the United States (US) provide temporary benefits
for eligible workers for up to 26 weeks. In times of high unemployment, the Extended Benefit
(EB) program extends the benefit period for another 20 weeks. In June 2008 (the wake of the
Great Recession), Congress created the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program.
Including the standard 26 weeks of regular State UI benefit, 20 weeks of EB, and a series of extensions,
the total weeks of available unemployment benefits reached a maximum of 99 weeks for an eligible
unemployed worker in late 2009 and continuing into 2012.
From Figure 1.2, it is clear to see that the Kentucky’s experience was similar to the rest of
US, but with higher unemployment rates than the average national level over the period, especially
during the Great Recession and in its aftermath. In addition to the extension of UI periods, weekly
benefit levels also increased in Kentucky over the course of the recession. Unlike most states in
the US, the weekly benefit payout eligibility in Kentucky is independent of the number of weeks of
benefit eligibility. This setting allows me to distinguish between UI benefit level and the number of
weeks of UI entitlement in terms of their effects on unemployment durations.
‘
2
Figure 1.2: Kentucky Unemployment Rate and Long-term Unemployment Share
This paper presents new estimates of the effect of multiple extensions of maximum UI
periods in the UI program implemented during the Great Recession (which began in December 2007
and ended in June 2009) using data from Kentucky. Within the broad empirical literature devoted
to examining effects of unemployment insurance, few studies have had the approaches to examine
the effects of the policy of multiple extensions such as those implemented in the US during the
Great Recession. My paper follows in the line that does investigate the effect of extensions of UI
periods during the Great Recession. Studies include Rothstein (2011), Farber and Valletta (2013)
and Fujita (2011), but all of these studies use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data, which
lack crucial information on claimants’ eligibility for benefits, and assume that all identified eligible
unemployed workers receive UI benefit payments. Farber and Valletta (2013) shows that only half
of unemployed individuals who are identified as UI recipients in these studies reported receiving UI
income, whereas around 40% of those who are identified as not eligible for UI reported UI income.
The detailed administrative data for the state of Kentucky, I use flexible specifications to
accurately capture variations in periods of UI across time and individuals. During my sample period,
the EUC program, which extended the UI repeatedly, paused on three occasions (April 4, May 50
and December 19 2010). By using the detailed administrative data, I also capture the effect of
3
the sudden removal of UI benefit. I find that the reduction of UI benefits encouraged recipients to
search for jobs intensively and increased the probability of finding jobs. My estimates suggest that
implementing the multiple extensions of UI periods decreases exit hazards for jobs by 1 percent,
which is twice the estimates from studies using CPS data (Farber and Valletta (2013), Fujita (2011)
and Rothstein (2011)). My estimates suggest that each additional week of UI eligibility increases
the duration of the unemployment duration by 0.4 week, which is in line with the previous estimates
in the US such as Card and Levine (2000) Meyer (1990) and Landais (2013). Given the maximum
of 53 weeks of UI extensions, the average unemployment duration could potentially increase by 21
weeks, which implies that a fair fraction of the persistent increase in long-term unemployment after
the Great Recession is due to a decline in UI recipients’ search efforts.
My most general specification suggests that the extended benefit coverage lengthens unem-
ployment durations , and the disincentive of UI extension dominates at most levels of remaining
benefit weeks. The marginal disincentive effect of the extension increases if extensions happen at
the end of a UI spell. Moreover, longer entitlements increase reemployment hazards for short-term
unemployed claimants, while discouraging long-term unemployed claimants from exiting UI to new
jobs.
1.2 Studies of the effect of Unemployment Insurance on the
Duration of Unemployment in the U.S.
A broad empirical literature is devoted to examining the effects of UI on the length of
unemployment spells. There is evidence from randomized social experiments in the U.S. show that
the generosity of UI benefits do change the incentives and affect the speed with which unemployment
workers leave the unemployment insurance. The most recent studies which investigate the effects of
the multiple extensions of the unemployment insurance on the labor market use matched individuals
across months of Current Population Survey (CPS) data, and conclude that the effect of extensions
to the UI period is small, with the estimates implying that only a small fraction of the persistent
increase in unemployment after the Great Recession was due to a decline in unemployed workers’
search efforts. Rothstein (2011), Farber and Valletta (2013) and Fujita (2011) adopt discrete-time
hazard specifications to model the conditional probability that an unemployment spell ends at certain
duration, and use competing risk models to analyze the transition out of unemployment to new jobs,
4
and exiting unemployment to leave the labor force.
The number of benefit weeks vary across individuals due to their eligibility for UI extensions.
In addition, since UI was extended when the labor market worsened, the total number of benefit
weeks available to each person varied with labor demand condition as well. Studies use different
strategies to identify the different components of the variation in benefit weeks by assuming that the
variations are exogenous to the unobserved determinants of the unemployment hazard. Rothstein
(2011) computes eligibility for benefits in each week between the time of being unemployed and the
time of initial interview, and simulates remaining benefit durations for each of them. Instead of
including simulated available benefit weeks between the time of displacement and the initial CPS
interviews, Farber and Valletta (2013) uses two dummy variables to capture the gradual extensions of
UI: the indicator for availability of extended benefits, EBit, and the indicator for whether individual
i is in the last month of availability of benefits, lastit. Fujita (2011) uses samples which cover the
periods between 2004-2007 and 2009-2010, and excludes the observations for 2008 when the EUC
was enacted. The data prior to 2008 are used to infer the shape of the hazard functions when there
was no UI. Nevertheless, these strategies fail to capture the dynamic changes of qualified benefit
weeks for each claimant.
5
Empirical Specification Data and Identification Findings
Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990).
Hazard model for exit from unemployment with
nonparametric baseline hazard and variables for benefit level,
and spikes of time until benefits exhaust.
Includes controls for state unemployment and past wages,
and state indicator variables.
U.S. CWBH data for 13 states 1978-1983.
Identification from differences in benefit schedules
across states and changes in benefits and potential
duration over time.
Elasticity of duration with respect to the benefit of 0.8,
and with respect to potential duration of 0.5
Card and Levine (2000).
Hazard models of exit from unemployment receipt.
U.S. administrative data for New Jersey. Examines
program that offered 13 weeks of ‘extended benefits’
for 6 months in 1996.
Elasticity of duration with respect to potential duration of 0.1
Rothstein (2011).
Logit model for exits from unemployment to
employment, and exits out of the labor force.
Current Population Survey (CPS) May 2004 - January 2011.
Use the haphazard roll-out of the EUC and EB programs
during the Great Recession to identify the
partial equilibrium effects of the UI extensions.
UI extensions reduced the average monthly
reemployment hazard of unemployed
displaced workers by 0.5 percentage points,
and reduced the monthly labor force exit hazard
by 1 percentage points.
Farber and Valletta (2013).
Probit model for exits from unemployment to employment,
and exits out of the labor force.
CPS for the periods 2000-2005 and 2007-2012
Base on individual variation in benefit availability,
conditional on state economic conditions and
individual characteristics to identify the UI effect
Extended UI increased the overall unemployment
rate by about 0.4 percentage points.
Fujita (2011) .
Logit model for exits from unemployment to employment,
and exits out of the labor force.
CPS male workers for the periods 2004-2007
and 2009-2010
Extended benefits have raised male workers
unemployment rate by 1.2 percentage points.
Table 1.1: Summarize studies of unemployment durations that are affected by UI.
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1.3 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides payments to people who apply for benefits and are
eligible to receive them due to involuntary job loss. To determine whether unemployed individuals
are monetarily eligible for the UI benefit, Kentucky has legislated tests which must be satisfied. To
maintain eligibility for benefits, unemployed UI recipients must continue searching for a new job.
Recipients can generally receive up to 26 weeks of benefits under the existing UI, and an additional
20 weeks of benefits from the Extended Benefit program (EB) when unemployment rates is over 8%.
To alleviate the severe negative employment shock during the Great Recession from Decem-
ber 2007 to June 2009, Congress created the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program in
June 2008, which offered an extension of UI benefits fully funded by the Federal government. After a
series of extensions, including regular 26-weeks State UI benefit and 20-weeks EB, the total weeks of
available unemployment benefits reached a maximum of 99 weeks for an eligible unemployed worker.
Table 1.2 shows the evolution of EUC program during and after the recession. The June
2008 legislation made 13 weeks of EUC benefits available to unemployed individuals who exhausted
regular benefits after May 1, 2007, and claimed regular UI after November 5, 2006. The EUC
program was expanded in November 2008. That expansion increased the EUC benefits to 20 weeks
and added a second tier of 13 additional weeks of benefits in states with unemployment rates above 6
percent. Additional expansions in February 2009 and November 2009 increased tier II benefits to 14
weeks and added tier III, which provided 13 additional weeks of benefits in states with unemployment
rates above 6 percent–and tier IV, an additional 6 weeks in states with unemployment rates above
8.5 percent. These EUC extensions created benefit durations as long as 53 weeks in some states
(including Kentucky). On three occasions (in April, June, and November 2010), Congress allowed
the program to expire. Each time, Congress eventually reauthorized it retroactive to the previous
expiration date, but this reauthorization took 7 weeks following the June expiration. During the
expiration, claimants were covered by EB if they would have been in EUC. In Figure 1.3, I present
the state unemployment rates and the dates of each EUC extension. It is clear to see that the series
extensions were not correlated with the change of the unemployment rates.
7
# of benefit weeks
under each Tier
Legislation Approved Weeks Covered I II III IV total(UI, EB)
6/30/2008 7/6/2008-3/28/2009 13 39
11/21/2008 11/23/2008-3/28/2009 20 13 59
2/17/2009 2/22/2009-12/26/2009 20 13 79
11/6/2009 11/8/2009-12/26/2009 20 14 13 6 99
12/19/2009 12/27/2009-2/27/2010 20 14 13 6 99
3/2/2010 2/28/2010-4/3/2010 20 14 13 6 99
4/15/2010R 4/4/2010-5/29/2010 20 14 13 6 99
5/30/2010− 7/18/2010 EUCLapsed 46
7/22/2010R 5/30/2010-11/27/2010 20 14 13 6 99
11/28/2010− 12/12/2010 EUCLapsed 46
12/17/2010R 12/19/2010-12/31/2011 20 14 13 6 99
12/23/2011 1/3/2012-3/6/2012 20 14 13 6 99
2/22/2012 3/6/2012-1/2/2013 14 14 9 10 93
Note: Kentucky triggered Extended Benefits (EB) on April 19, 2009, and the total number
of benefit weeks subsequently increased by 20 weeks.
RRetroactively funds EUC.
Table 1.2: EUC Legal Changes
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Figure 1.3: EUC change dates
1.4 Data
In this paper, I use data drawn from the Kentucky Office of Employment and Training 3.
The administrative data contain quarterly records for each individual filing for UI compensation
from January 2006 through December 2011. The information relevant for my study includes the
number of weeks for each claim; claimants drew benefit from which UI program; the benefit amount
for which each claimant was eligible; the actual amount of benefit they drew; base-period earnings,
and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, employer NAICS code, and years of
schooling.
In addition, I have another important resource for this study is the quarterly wage files, which
cover UI recipients in my sample from 2005 through 2013. The wage file contains detailed information
about these UI claimants before and after they were in the UI programs, including earnings both
before and after their UI spell and major industry sectors. Unlike most of the administrative data
used in previous research, merging the data file helps me to track individuals into their first post-UI
employment spell and permits me to calculate individuals’ unemployment durations and examine
3The data were randomized and anonymous without personal identifiers.
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the effects of UI not simply on the probability of exiting UI, but on the probability of finding
employment.
Figure 1.4(a) and (b) explain how a particular change of policy would affect individuals who
filed UI claims in different time. The law used in this example was approved in November 21, 2008,
and created the second tire (13 more benefit weeks) in EUC and added 7 additional weeks, beyond
the original 13 weeks, into Tier I. The law covered unemployment from December 23, 2008 to March
22, 2009. Subfigure(a) illustrates the situation that claimant A filed a UI claim one week earlier
than claimant B and exhausted the regular 26-weeks UI right before the law enacted. Claimant A
was not qualified to be extended into EUC Tier I. In subfigure(b), claimant C started the UI one
week earlier than claimant D, and hence he transitioned into Tier II before the end date (March 22,
2009) of the law. Figure 1.4(c) presents the evolution of changes of remaining benefit weeks for two
people in my sample during the covered UI spell. For people who started the UI claims at various
dates, they would be eligible for different amount of extensions (and reductions). Yet their changes
in the remaining benefit weeks happen at the same week when the new policy is announced.
Table 1.3 reports summary statistics of variables for the analyzed sample. The sample
includes 81,772 displaced workers who files 117,524 UI claims.4 Just under 5% (= 5786117524 ) of claims
were filed before EUC was authorized and were not eligible for the extension. Among those claims
filed after the EUC legislation, 17.76% of claims were extended from state UI to EUC, and 8.47%
of EUC claims were extended by EB with potential 99 benefit weeks.
Before EUC was implemented, unemployed individuals had average UI durations of 10.4
weeks, while qualifying for 26 benefit weeks.5 After EUC was enacted, individuals still had much
longer UI durations – 29.32 weeks, yet expected 31.92 benefit weeks on average. The exhaustion
rate, defined as the share of claims that exhausted all eligible benefit weeks, decreased largely after
EUC was enacted. However, the rate of exit only decreased 3% after the extension.
4In analyzing the effect of extending UI periods, I use all observations in my sample. However in my analysis of the
effect of UI benefits, I exclude observations with censored unemployment durations and wrongly recorded base-period
earnings.
5In Kentucky, the number of benefit weeks of each UI claim is the same across qualified individuals. As long as





















Figure 1.4: Examples of extension of UI spells
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Sample for the study into the extension of UI periods
Before EUC After EUC
# Claims filed 5,786 111,738
Share of state UI 100.00% 73.77%
Share of EUC 0.00% 17.76%
Share of EB 0.00% 8.47%
Average of total benefit weeks used 10.40 29.23
Average of anticipated weeks of benefits 15.60 31.92
Exhaustion Rate 28.02% 12.60%
Exit Rate for jobs 70.53% 67.40%
# of Sampled unemployed 81,772
# of Claims 117,524
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics I
1.5 Empirical Specifications
To isolate unemployment duration based on multiple extensions to UI, Rothstein (2011)
develops a model by assuming that the wage is exogenous and constant across different individuals,
and agents choose their search efforts based purely on the number of benefit weeks remaining, denoted
as d. Rothstein (2011) presented three propositions in his paper 6: First, as workers approach their
UI benefit expirations, search intensity rises. Second, Individuals who are running out of benefits
exert higher search efforts than individuals who are at the beginning of their unemployment spell
with a lot of benefits still available. Thus, extending the UI period will reduce search efforts and
the probability of exiting from UI to the labor market, which is known as the disincentive effect or
moral hazard effect.7 Furthermore, the policy requires that only if unemployed workers continue
their job search and exert search efforts higher than some given level, then they are eligible to
receive the insurance benefit across time. Based on this setting, the third proposition in Rothstein
(2011) is that extensions of unemployment benefits extend unemployed workers’ job search —because
searching for work is a requirement for UI claimants to be eligible for the extension—and therefore,
multiple extensions could possibly increase reemployment rates by lengthening the search time for
6I explain and prove them in details in the Appendix
7As indicated in Chetty (2008), given plausible parameterizations of the shape of the search function, the reduction
has higher effects on individuals who have exhausted their regular benefits than on those who are still receiving their
regular benefits.
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unemployed claimants. Combining this with the disincentive effect of the UI, the net effect on the
probability of exiting from UI to jobs is ambiguous, as predicted in Rothstein (2011). In the following
two subsections, I will discuss specifications of Rothstein (2011) and mine, respectively, and test the
three propositions presented above.
1.5.1 Replications of Rothstein (2011)
In this section, I estimate the reduced-form specification hazard model in Rothstein (2011)
to assess predictions in the job search model, investigating the effects of multiple extensions to UI
periods on the duration of unemployment spells. The dependent variable yit is defined as whether
a claimant exit from UI into employment at week t.
Given the importance of time-dependent covariates and censoring in the data, hazard models
are widely used in the literature. Since employing a parametric assumption about baseline hazard can
lead to inconsistent hazard estimates when the assumed shape of the baseline is incorrect8, Meyer
(1990) extensively discussed the use of reduced-form hazard models (e.g., the Cox proportional
hazard model) which non-parametrically estimate the baseline hazard.9 In this section, logit models
use binary dependent variables and hence are also a reduced form discrete time hazard model. Logit
models are used to estimate the weekly hazard of exiting UI for jobs hit.
10
Rothstein (2011) uses different specifications to identify the heterogeneity in policy which
is denoted as Policy in the following equations. Assuming that the weekly hazard of leaving UI for




) = α+ ΠPolicyit + Controlit + εit, (1.1)
In the first specification, let Policyit = Tit and represent the total number of weeks of benefits avail-
able to the individual i, which by definition is equal to the benefit weeks used, nit, plus the expected
number of future benefit weeks, dit. The number of benefit weeks, nit, is the number of weeks
that unemployed person i in calendar week t has been unemployed and receiving benefits. where
8There is rarely theoretical support for any particular shape for the baseline hazard.
9For example, variations over time that are not captured in the parametric baseline would be used to estimate
the hazard. When variations across observations are more than over time, the non-parametric baseline ensures the
consistency of the estimates while sacrificing a small amount of efficiency.
10Generally, individuals are identified as exiting for work when they leave UI if they reported positive earnings
at the same time. In this paper, I treat people who exit but do not find a job as right-censored records when they
stopped claiming benefits from UI, which is the exactly how I treat people who exhaust their entitled benefits.
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Controlit includes Mt a set of fixed time dummies for calendar month, Xi a vector of individual-level
covariates, including gender, race, education level, age, and indicators for previous industry, and Bn
a flexible polynomial function to represent the baseline hazard. The baseline hazard describes the
hazard for individuals with all characteristics set at certain baseline values, which serves as a ref-
erence group. By contrast, the increase or reduction in risk deviated from the baseline hazard is
being called deviation hazard, which captures changes of exit hazards for a set of characteristics of
interest.
The coefficient Π in equation (1.1) describes the net effect of Tit on exit hazard from UI
to a job, which is the effect’s deviation from the baseline effect. The variation in Tit comes from
repeated extensions of the EUC. The estimate of Π measures the effect of the benefit weeks available
conditional on how many benefit weeks have already been used , except for the effect of the baseline.
Since the estimate of Π represents the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on exit hazards, as
the model predicted, if it is negative, then the disincentive effect of the extension dominates.
The flexible polynomial function of nit used in the equation (1.1) has the form as followed:




it + γ4I(nit=0) (1.2)
In this baseline hazard function, Rothstein (2011) allowss that there is a discontinuity at zero benefit
week. The data set includes all individuals who filed the unemployment insurance program, with
or without drawing benefits from the program. In my data, the probability of finding employment
among workers who claim no benefit is 67%, which is significantly higher than the probability among
those who claim at least 1 week benefits. The duration dependence is measured by the estimated
coefficients of equation (1.2) as follow 11:
∂Bn
∂nit
|nit=n>0 = γ̂1 + 2γ̂2n− γ̂3n−2it (1.3)
As predicted in the job search model, the probability of exiting unemployment raises as
the UI exhaustion point approaches. The model developed in Rothstein (2011) also implied that
benefit extensions do not have the same effects on those near exhaustion as on those just beginning
their spells. The next specification, from Rothstein (2011), allows that the effect of total benefit
11Duration dependence is defined as whether the probability of exiting the state of interest depends upon how long
one has stayed in it. A positive(negative) duration dependence refers to a(n) increasing(decreasing) exit hazards as
the longer time spent in the state.
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weeks Yit for individuals who have been unemployed for less than 26 weeks, defined as short-term
unemployed, is different from the effect for individuals who have been unemployed for more than 26
weeks, defined as long-term unemployed. The Policyit becomes:
ΠPolicyit = θ1TitI(nit < 26) + θ2TitI(nit ≥ 26) + θ3I(nit ≥ 26) (1.4)
The coefficient θ1 stands for the effect of Tit on the exit hazard contributed by short-term unem-
ployed, and the coefficient θ2 represents the effect of Tit on the exit hazard contributed by long-term
unemployed. The effect of Tit actually describes the additional rate of exit for people with more
benefits. If so, the extension happened to unemployed individuals who just begin their spells should
have smaller effect than to unemployed individuals who are close to their exhaustions. In other
words, the absolute value of θ1 should be smaller than the absolute value of θ2. The coefficient θ3
captures the pure shift of the fitted log odds at the 26 benefit weeks.
In the two specifications above, the total benefit weeks available to individuals (Tit) would
have been constant across time for each person if there were no extensions of the UI programs,
and hence the changes of Tit describes the modification of the police. The next specification from
Rothstein (2011) focuses on the interaction between the number of remaining benefit weeks, dit, and
the number of benefit weeks that have been used to date, nit. Using the remaining benefit weeks
can capture the changes of the exit hazards while moving toward the exhaustion of UI. The Policyit
can be written as follow:
ΠPolicyit = α1I(dit > 0) + α2dit (1.5)
Since the remaining benefit weeks decrease one week each week without the extensions of the UI,
the variation of dit comes from the addition of new EUC tiers, which extend the potential benefit
for individuals who will be able to transit into new tiers before the program expires, but not for
individuals who will exhaust their benefit before the new tire implements. Due to the frequent
changes of the EUC, dit will not always decrease one week as nit increase one week. In another
word, this specification does not produce perfect collinearity while including both dit and used nit
at the same time.
Holding constant nit, dit reflects various individuals’ expectations of their future benefit.
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Higher dit means the unemployed workers are eligible for more extensions, and hence the exit rates
would be lower. Rothstein (2011)’s model predicts that when approaching to the UI benefit expira-
tion, search intensity rises, and hence the probability of exit UI for jobs increases as well. Therefore,
the sign of the estimated coefficient α2 is expected to be negative.
In my study, this remaining benefit week actually counts in the evolution of the extension
of the EUC. Individual who has higher dit does not necessarily mean that he is at the earlier stage
of the UI than another individual who has lower dit and who is supposed to be at the later stage of
the UI. Facing the same amount of used benefit weeks, this could be caused by the two individuals
enrolled in the UI at different time t, and only the UI benefit of the first individual’s got extended,
but not of the second individual’s.
To better illustrate the relationship between the remaining benefit weeks and the exit haz-





φsI(dit = s) (1.6)
In this specification, the baseline Bn(nit; γ) is a full set of indicators of nit.
The coefficients φ capture the unrestricted effect on each week. The solid line in Figure
1.5 illustrates the coefficients of indicators of remaining benefit weeks φ̂s versus the corresponding
available weeks, and the dashed line represents the lowess-smoothed trend. As indicated in the
Figure 1.5, the smoothed line shows a general pattern of φ̂s increasing as dit falls toward about 20,
then rising rapidly as dit falls further. φ̂s tend higher as benefits are exhausted. This implies that
the probably of finding employment rises as benefits are exhausted. These are consistent with the
general trend predicted from Rothstein (2011)’s model. With depressed search effort, the individuals
with many weeks left would have lower exit hazards. As benefit exhaustion approaching, they will
increase search effort and reach a maximum value at the time of exhaustion.
Results
Column (1) of Table 1.4 presents logit estimates of first specification of equation (1.1), with
standard errors clustered at the individual level. The estimate of Π is -0.00979, which indicates that
the higher the total benefit weeks available, the unemployed individuals are less likely to exit into
12The maximum value of dit in my data is 80
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Figure 1.5: Remaining Benefit Effect
employment. The significant negative effect of the number of benefit weeks used, -0.0375, indicates
diminishing exit hazards as individuals’ unemployment duration increases. Some individuals enrolled
and then left UI without drawing any benefit and have 0 benefit weeks recorded. According to the
significant positive coefficient on zero-benefit-week indicator, 1.953, these individuals are more likely
to exit UI for jobs than people who drew benefit payments.




|nit=n>0 = −0.0375 + 0.000582n+ 0.473n−2it (1.7)
When n is smaller than 13 weeks, as n becomes lager, the negative duration dependence gets stronger,
and the exit hazard decreases at an increasing rate. Between 13 and 64 weeks, the negative duration
dependence becomes weaker. At 65 weeks, the baseline effect begins to be positive and increase as
n increasing. However, the effect deviated from the baseline is -0.00979 (Π̂), and this demonstrates
that the exit hazard decreases at a constant rate as the unemployed workers stay in UI longer. Since
the magnitude of the deviated effect is generally larger than the baseline effect, this first specification
predicts that the longer being unemployed, the lower overall exit hazard would be.
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Table 1.4: Estimates of Specifications (1.1) and (1.3)
VAR (1) (2) (3) (4)
Eqn(1.1) Eqn(1.1) Eqn(1.3) Eqn(1.3)
total # of benefit wks -0.00979*** -0.00998***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
total # of benefit wks 0.00263*** 0.00247***
(if unemp duration <26) (0.0006) (0.0006)
total # of benefit wks -0.0335*** -0.0336***
(if unemp duration>=26) (0.0007) (0.0007)
1(unemp duration=26) 2.897*** 2.895***
(0.0462) (0.0462)
Controls
Monthly FE Y Y Y Y
Demographic info. Y Y Y Y
Insured unem rate cubic cubic
New UI claims rate cubic cubic
Base line # of used wks -0.0375*** -0.0373*** -0.0731*** -0.0730***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
1(used wks=0) 1.953*** 1.961*** 2.617*** 2.625***
(0.0656) (0.0654) (0.0731) (0.0730)
(used wks) 2 0.000291*** 0.000291*** 0.000668*** 0.000668***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
1/ (used wks) -0.473*** -0.477*** -0.948*** -0.953***
(0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0438) (0.0437)
Constant -2.335*** -2.170*** -2.812*** -2.661***
(0.1010) (0.2630) (0.1050) (0.2640)
Pseudo-log likelihood -343504.11 -340644.25 -343451.07 -340624.56
Pseudo R2 0.0692 0.0693 0.0769 0.0770
Claims 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504
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Column (3) of Table 1.4 shows the results of specification (1.4). For a short-term unemployed
individual, the marginal effect of Tit on the log odds
13 is θ̂1 (0.00263). As total benefit weeks
increasing, the exit hazards start to climb as well. The coefficient of the indicator, which indicates
whether individuals belong to the long-term unemployed group, has a significantly positive estimate,
2.897. This big positive shift captures the changes in the exit hazards between short-term and long-
term unemployed workers. People who exhausted the regular 26 benefit weeks and did not continue
the extended UI programs contribute the big jump of the coefficient. Besides, people who exhausted
the regular UI and got extended to the EUC program have diminishing exit hazard as the total benefit
weeks become larger, which is captured by the marginal effect of Tit on the long-term unemployment
individuals θ̂2 (-0.0335). Column (2) and (4) of Table 1.4 adds additional controls of slackness to
the two specifications respectively: cubics in insured unemployment rates and new UI claims rates.
The estimated effects move a bit, but within a very narrow range.
Estimates of this specification (1.5) are shown in the Table 1.5. The first two columns used
the same baseline specifications as equation (1.2). To smooth out the week-to-week changes at the
beginning of the UI claim durations, and flatten exit spikes brought in by the policies at the end of
each tire of UI, column (3) and (4) used splines of the used benefit weeks as a new baseline hazard
function 14, and the last two columns used a full set of indicator of nit to represent the baseline
hazard.
The first estimate of α1, as shown in column (1), is -1.984. This negative effect represents
that people who still have positive remaining benefit weeks have significantly lower exit hazards than
people who are drawing their last benefit. As I discussed above, the estimate of α2 should also be
negative. In my result, the estimates from the first and third baseline specifications are negative,
but not the estimates from the second specification. It is also noticeable that the estimates can be
changed largely by different forms of baseline hazard functions. Among these three specifications,
the full set indicators of the used benefit weeks smoothed spikes of exiting rates at the end of the
program better than the others, and hence I will use this baseline hazard function in the following
specifications.
13Log odds is defined as ln( hit
1−hit
)
14The splines has the form Bn =
ν=26∑
ν=0
γνnitν + µ1I(27 ≤ nit ≤ 30) + µ2I(31 ≤ nit ≤ 40) + µ3I(41 ≤ nit ≤
50) + µ4I(51 ≤ nit ≤ 60) + µ5I(61 ≤ nit ≤ 70) + µ6I(71 ≤ nit ≤ 80) + µ7I(81 ≤ nit ≤ 90) + µ8I(91 ≤ nit ≤ 99)
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Table 1.5: Estimates of Specification (1.5) With Different Controls
VAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(remaining benefit>0) -1.984*** -1.985*** -0.756*** -0.757*** -0.503*** -0.503***
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.0267)
# remaining benefit wks -0.00131** -0.00152** 0.000348 0.000185 -0.00180*** -0.00198***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Controls
Monthly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic info. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Insured unem rate cubic cubic cubic
New UI claims rate cubic cubic cubic
Base line
# of used wks -0.0505*** -0.0506***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
1(used wks=0) 2.162*** 2.171***
(0.0660) (0.0659)
(used wks)2 0.000300*** 0.000300***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
1/ (used wks) -0.621*** -0.625***
(0.0385) (0.0384)
Linear Spline Y Y
Dummies
for unem durations Y Y
Pseudo-log likelihood -340219.14 -340161.27 -331984.81 -331940.66 -330725.14 -330678.05
Pseudo R2 0.0781 0.0782 0.1004 0.1005 0.1038 0.1039
Claims 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504
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1.5.2 Extensions of the Specifications of Policy Effects
To identify the effect of the policy change on the probability of exiting UI for jobs hit,
directly, I define variable ∆it as the change in the number of remaining benefit weeks between week
t and week t− 1 for person i, i.e., ∆i,t = di,t − di,t−1, where dit represents the number of remaining
benefit weeks. My main specification follows a logistic function:
ΠPolicyit = α1I(dit > 0) + α2di,t−1 + δ∆it (1.8)
In this specification, control M∗t is a set of fixed time dummies for each calendar month. Bn(nit; γ) is
a full set of indicators of the benefit weeks used, nit, to represent the baseline hazard. Estimating δ
will capture the net effect of the policy directly. After trying different functional forms to characterize
the baseline hazards (as discussed above), a full set of indicators for the benefit weeks used, nit, best
smooths spikes in exit rates at the end of the program.
Moreover, to control the macroeconomic conditions, I include fixed time effects for calendar
month, three-order polynomial insured unemployment rates, and three-order polynomial new UI
claims rates. Since each policy modification added in (or deducted) almost same numbers of benefit
weeks to eligible individuals, the lump of changes happened to claimants at the same time t can be
explained by the time dummy. In another word, the change variable is almost collinear with the
monthly dummy at time t, if there was a policy change. Since the implementation of UI extensions
were exogenous and macro economic conditions prevailing in each month were roughly the same in
the nearest month, to fix the collinearity issue, the monthly dummy Mt is substituted by the month
Mt+1
15 if there was a policy change in month t in this specification and below.
In my main specification, the change in the number of benefit weeks remaining ∆it has
three scenarios: 1) There is no change in policy, and claimants consume one week’s benefit while
moving to the next calendar week, and hence ∆it decreases by one; 2) The number of benefit weeks
is increased, so the value of ∆it is larger than -1. 3) During the periods when EUC was paused,
the change in the number of benefit weeks was lower than -1.16 To distinguish between the three
15Mt−1 was also tried, and the results were consistent.
16To remove the possible double-negative issue in interpreting coefficients, I use the absolute values of ∆it in my
regression. For instance, if dit changed from 4 to 0 at week t, the corresponding ∆it=-4 means the policy actually
removed 4 remaining benefit weeks at t. After taking the absolute values of ∆it, |∆it| = 4 represents the deduction
of 4 remaining benefit weeks, and the coefficient measures the effect of one more week being deducted on exit rates.
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scenarios, I include three categorical terms in the next specification, which has the form:
ΠPolicyit = α1I(dit > 0) + α2di,t−1 + δ1∆itI(∆it > −1) + δ2I(∆it = −1)
+ δ3|∆it|I(∆it < −1) (1.9)
δ1 estimates the net effect of the policy extension, and δ2 is the net effect of the policy lapse on
unemployment durations.
To better capture the exogenous variations across different individuals who faced the same
amount of benefit changes, I interact ∆it with remaining benefit weeks di,t−1, which indicates the
stage of UI when the policy changed. Interaction terms like these show that the marginal effect
of policy changes can vary with different stages of UI across individuals. The new specifications
correspond to the main specification and specification (1.8) can be written as:
ΠPolicyit = α1I(dit > 0) + α2di,t−1 + δ∆it + θdi,t−1 ∗∆it (1.10)
ΠPolicyit = α1I(dit > 0) + α2di,t−1 + δ1∆itI(∆it > −1) + δ2di,t−1 ∗∆itI(∆it > −1)
+ δ3I(∆it = −1) + δ4|∆it|I(∆it < −1) + δ5di,t−1 ∗ |∆it|I(∆it < −1)
(1.11)
In my most general specification, I separate the increase in benefit weeks into the different
times when the policy was modified. For instance, I included the term ∆itI(t1 ≤ ∆it ≤ t2), which
represents changes to remaining benefit week which occurred between the first and second policy
changes. Benefit changes occurred 12 times during my sample periods, as indicated in Table 1.6,
and hence 12 terms are added to my main specification. In the meanwhile, I also control for periods
of which extensions the individual experienced before and after a particular extension. For instance,
before the second extension, the individual i might have experienced the first extension, and is
going to be entitled more benefits in the latter extensions after the second. To identify the effect of
the second extensions, I add in dummy controls which exclude the effect from the first extensions,
and the extensions in the future. This can guarantee that the coefficient estimates of the term
∆itI(t1 ≤ ∆it ≤ t2) isolates the effect of the second extension.
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δ3t∆itI(∆it > −1)I(EPit = t) +
12∑
k=1,k 6=t
I(Pik = k), (1.12)
where EPit represents the extended period which the individual i is experiencing, and Pik controls
for the past and future extensions that the individual i have.
Using various specifications, the key set of parameters δ can be identified. I present them
in Table 1.6, and will discuss them in details in the next subsection.
Results
The estimates of my main specification (1.8) are shown in the first column of Table 1.6.
The estimate of α1, as shown in column (1), is -0.57. This negative effect represents the fact that
individuals who still have benefit weeks remaining have significantly lower exit hazards than people
who are drawing their last benefit. The estimate of di−1 is -0.00191, which indicates that the net
effect of the UI benefit extension is negative, and the disincentive effect of UI dominates.
After decomposing the policy changes into three scenarios, as shown in Column (3) of Table
1.6, the estimated reduction effect is 0.0148, which describes the positive effect of the reduction in
the benefit spells on exit hazards. The more benefit weeks are removed, the higher exit hazards will
be. The estimate of δ2 in equation (1.9) is 0.622. Compared with other individuals who experienced
policy changes, unemployed workers whose benefits decrease naturally tend to exit UI for jobs faster.
Column (5) of Table 1.6 shows the estimates from my most general specification (1.12). The negative
effects of extending UI periods on exit hazards are observed for almost every period.
Column (2) of Table 1.6 shows estimates of equation (1.10). The estimated coefficient of
change in remaining benefit weeks (δ̂) is -0.00813, and the estimate of the interaction term (θ̂) is
0.000322. The marginal effect of the change in benefit weeks on the log odds ratio of equation (1.10)
can be written as:
∂ln( hit1−hit )
∂∆it
= δ + θdi,t−1 (1.13)
Plugging these two into equation (1.13), the marginal effect of the change on the log odds ratio is
−0.00813+0.000322∗di,t−1, and diminishes with the number of benefit weeks remaining. When di,t−1
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Table 1.6: Effects of UI period on Unemployment spells
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Eqn(1.8) Eqn(1.10) Eqn(1.9) Eqn(1.11)
1(remaining benefit>0) -0.570*** -0.568*** -0.747*** -0.747***
(0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0302) (0.0302)
# remaining benefit wks at t-1 -0.00191*** -0.00181*** -0.00144** -0.00187***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
# of remaining wks changed 0.00136 -0.00813***
(0.0013) (0.0029)
(#wks remainins at t-1) *( # wks changed) 0.000322***
(0.0001)
Extension Effect 0.0166*** -0.00508*
(0.0018) (0.00287)
(#wks remainins at t-1) *( # wks increased) 0.000480***
(0.0001)
Reduction Effect 0.0148*** 0.0545***
(0.0026) (0.0107)
(#wks remainins at t-1) *( # wks reduced) -0.00108***
(0.0003)
I(remaining wks reduced naturally) 0.622*** 0.676***
(0.0416) (0.0437)
Pseudo-log likelihood -276980.26 -276967.44 -276860.55 -276831.11
Pseudo R2 0.1021 0.1108 0.1210 0.1500
Claims 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504
Note: In these five specifications, I control for the individual-level covariates, fixed time effects per
calendar month, three-order polynomial weekly insured unemployment rates, three-order polynomial
weekly new UI claims rates, and baseline hazard. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***(**) (*)






# of remaining wks reduced by policy 0.421*
(-0.25)
I(remaining wks reduced naturally) 0.246***
(0.0895)
# of increased benefit wks after 1st policy change -0.0325**
(0.0129)
# of increased benefit wks after 2nd policy change -0.0143***
(0.0040)
# of increased benefit wks after 3rd policy change -0.0080
(0.0115)
# of increased benefit wks after 4th policy change -0.0400*
(0.0211)
# of increased benefit wks after 5th policy change -0.0510***
(0.0167)
# of increased benefit wks after 6th policy change -0.0210*
(0.0112)
# of increased benefit wks after 7th policy change -0.0496***
(0.0188)
# of increased benefit wks after 8th policy change -0.0173*
(0.0097)
# of increased benefit wks after 9th policy change -0.0113***
(0.0035)
# of increased benefit wks after 10th policy change 0.0108*
(0.0060)
# of increased benefit wks after 11th policy change 0.0126
(0.0127)






is smaller and equal to 25 weeks, the marginal effect is negative, which implies that the disincentive
effect of UI dominates and becomes more pronounced as approaching to the exhaustion. Conversely,
the positive effect of UI on unemployment duration dominates when more than 26 benefit weeks
remain, and moving towards the beginning of the spell, the number of extra benefit weeks added
could accelerate the rates of exit for employment.
Results from the similar interaction strategy in equation (1.11) are presented in Column
(4) of Table 1.6. The estimate of the interaction terms for the benefit reduction is -0.00108. The
negative estimate explains that the marginal effect of the reduction in benefit durations on the log
odds increases as fewer benefit weeks remain, which implies that reductions from policy change
occurring at the end of the UI spell (with smaller values of di,t−1) increase claimants’ job finding
rates more than if the reduction occurs at the beginning of the spell.
1.5.3 Simulate the effects of EUC Policy
The results in previous tables indicate that extensions to UI periods reduced the probability
that a UI recipient found a job. To quantify the estimate in terms of interpreting the extension
effect, this section presents simulations of the net effect of the extensions on unemployment spells,
which is obtained by comparing actual unemployment exit hazards with counterfactual hazards that
would have existed without extensions. In the logit model, the predicted average weekly hazard








is the estimated coefficients from prior specifications. Vt is the policy variables, which
include dit and ∆it, and measure the policy changes over time and across individuals. In this part,
I reconstruct the policy variables by assuming there is no extension for each unemployed individual,
and the maximum benefit weeks they could claim is 26 weeks. The predicted counterfactual weekly
hazard is calculated by using new values for these reconstructed variables and estimated from the
corresponding specifications:






where VCF,t are reconstructed policy variables with counterfactual values.
Figure 1.6 plot the actual, counterfactual, and 95% weekly hazards predicted by different
specifications. The shaded areas are the simulated confidence intervals for the counterfactual hazard
at the 95% confidence interval. In general, the counterfactual hazards are higher than the actual
ones, which supports the prediction that reducing the number of benefit weeks would increase the
probability of exiting UI for employment. Another notable pattern is spikes in the hazard just before
each program reaches exhaustion. The spike in the exit rates from unemployment at the expiration
of jobless benefits is documented as one of the best-known empirical results in labor economics. It is
widely interpreted as evidence that recipients wait until their benefits run out to search intensively
and return to work.
These figures also give a closer examinations of the baseline hazard functions. Figure 1.6.a
and 1.6.b use estimates from equation (1.1) and (1.3), respectively, but with the same baseline
functions as indicated in Table 1.4 Column (2) and (4). However, the two shapes of hazards are
distinct from each other, even for the weeks before 26, which shouldn’t have changed much in
both actual and counterfactual scenarios. It seems the baseline hazard function fails to capture
the variation brought in by the sample, and induces different specifications to produce non-robust
results. Figure 1.6c and Figure 1.6d adopts same specification of equation (1.5) but different baseline
functions from Table 1.5 Column(2) and (6). It is obvious to see that the one used to plot 6.b, the full
set indicators of used benefit weeks, generates much smaller standard errors of the counterfactual
hazards, and captures the spikes of exiting around the exhaustion of UI better. Applying this
baseline function, I get consistent shapes of the predicted hazards from different specifications used
in Figure 3.3e and 3.3f which uses equation (1.8) and (1.9).
The difference between the actual average weekly hazards and the counterfactual average
weekly hazards, denoted as ∆ht, captures the effects of the UI extensions on the average exit hazards.
Let In represent the size of each sample with a different number of benefit weeks used, n, then:














The first column in Table 1.7 shows the actual average monthly hazards, which are converted from the
corresponding weekly hazards calculated from equation (1.14). Row Table 1.4 Column (2) shows the
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Table 1.7: Hazard rates of exiting UI for jobs
Actual Avg. Mon C.F Avg. Mon ĥActual − ĥCF E(D) − ECF (D) ∆ # wk of D given
Exit Hazard Exit Hazard one more benefit wk
Table 1.4 0.1042 0.1105 -0.0063 28.4930 0.3903
Column (2) (0.0062) (0.0076)
Table 1.4 0.1050 0.1119 -0.0069 29.3039 0.4014
Column (4) (0.0063) (0.0077)
Table 1.5 0.1058 0.1100 -0.0042 28.6574 0.3926
Column (2) (0.0089) (0.0213)
Table 1.5 0.1066 0.1113 -0.0047 29.0080 0.3974
Column (6) (0.0064) (0.0078)
Table 1.6 0.1065 0.1189 -0.0123 31.2002 0.4274
Column (1) (0.0210) (0.0470)
Table 1.6 0.1085 0.1193 -0.0108 31.3203 0.4126
Column (3) (0.0063) (0.0077)
Note: To better capture the extension effect, in the simulation part, I use the sample which only experienced
the UI extension, but not before EUC enacted or EUC paused. Each row name represents Table number and
Column number. Simulated standard errors are given in parentheses.
predicted hazards from estimates of my specifications in Table 1.4 Column 2. Overall, the predicted
monthly hazards in the fourth quarter of 2010 are broadly consistent across different specifications.
The same pattern is also observed in the second column, counterfactual predicted monthly hazard.
The third column of Table 1.7 is the difference between actual hazards and counterfactual hazards,
which indicates the changes to the exit probability by extending UI from 26 weeks to 99 weeks. In
general, implementing the UI extension decreases exit hazards for jobs by 0.007 to 0.01. 17
I also simulate the effect of changes in the length of UI benefits on the duration of unem-
ployment spells, using the methodology of Farber and Valletta (2013). I assume that individuals’
behavior is consistent after benefits are exhausted, and hence the weekly hazard of a spell ending
after the maximum benefit duration is constant as well. The constant feature implies the conditional
distribution of hazard is exponential and the expected unemployment spells for individuals censored
17Rothstein (2011) concludes that extending UI decreases the rate of exiting for jobs by 0.005 (0.5 percentage point)
for workers who are eligible for unemployed insurance.
29
from the exhaustion is the inverse of the constant hazard.
The key quantity used in the simulation is the predicted survivor function for each individual
i in week t. The predicted survivor function in week t is the predicted probability that a UI spell
lasts until at least t:







where ĥi(τ) is the estimated unemployment exit probability for individual i in week τ . I further
assume that the weekly hazard of a spell ending after 99 weeks is constant for each individual at
the average value for that individual of the hazard from weeks 79 to 99. On this basis, the expected








where h̄i is the average hazard across weeks 79-99 of the estimated weekly hazard of the unemploy-
ment spell of individual i. In my counterfactual study, the maximum number of benefit weeks is 26;
therefore, the counterfactual expected unemployment duration is calculated as a rolling sum of 26
weeks.
Similarly, I use the predicted hazard from the counterfactual study to simulate S̄(t)cf and
Ecf (D) assuming a maximum of 26 benefit weeks. The difference between E(D) and Ecf (D) is the
change in unemployment spells given the extension of UI, which are shown in the fourth column of
Table 3.5. Adding 79 benefit weeks during the Great Recession increased the average unemployment
spell from 28 to 31 weeks, and hence the average unemployment spell increased 0.4 weeks with the
addition of an extra benefit week, as shown in the last column of Table 3.5. This finding is larger than
Farber and Valletta (2013)’s result, which suggests that extended benefit increased unemployment
spells by about 7% (1.96 weeks on the basis of 28 weeks). On the other hand, my estimates are
consistent with previous estimates in the US using administrative data, such as Card and Levine
(2000), Katz and Meyer (1990), and Landais (2013).18
Generally, my estimates are higher than the recent empirical studies which use CPS data
(Rothstein (2011), Farber and Valletta (2013) and Fujita (2011)). CPS data arguably identify the
18These papers’ estimates suggest that the duration of UI claims increase by around 0.3 to 0.4 weeks on average by
increasing the potential duration of benefit by a week. These studies define the dependent variable as the probability
of exhausting all available benefit while leaving UI, instead of the probability of finding jobs. To make the comparison
meaningful, I redefine my dependent variable in the same way, and simulate hazard rates of exhausting UI and the
corresponding expected durations of UI claims.
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eligibility of UI recipients, and put strong assumptions on the exogenous policy variations across
individuals. My detailed administrative data help me use flexible specifications to more accurately
capture the variations in UI across time and individuals. My results also suggest that, during the
Great Recession, the supply response of unemployment to the multiple extensions was not extremely
different from what previous studies suggest. The disincentive effect of the UI still dominated and
affected people’s search effort almost the same as before.
1.5.4 Difference-in-Differences Estimates
To identify the effects of a change in UI benefit weeks on the possibilities of leaving UI
for jobs, I can also compare the pattern of UI recipients before and after the policy change. The
economic shocks could affect job search results for both the group affected by the law modification
(treatment group) and the group not qualified for the extra benefit from the new law (control group).
In the meanwhile, the new policy could influence the incentive and search effort only those who are
eligible for the change. Since I am interested in identifying the treatment effect, the effect of the
systematic shocks to the labor market should be controlled.
Conventionally, this can be solved by a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy in which the
model takes the difference in the behavior before and after the new policy for a treatment group
and subtract from the difference in the behavior before and after the new policy of a group that is
not affected by the new change. The change of the behavior in the control group can capture the
general economic shocks and labor market trend.
In my study, individuals whose UI spells were in progress after the announcement of a UI
extension, yet ineligible for the extension may nonetheless have been affected by the policy – that
is, by the very announcement itself. A difference-in-difference estimation strategy allows me to
account for this possibility. I start by separating the group of UI claims that are eligible for each
EUC extension from the claims which are not qualified for the corresponding extension before and
after the new policy announced. My base comparison is the difference between the averages for the
extension eligible and ineligible individuals in the treatment group.
Denote EUCijt = 1 if individual i was eligible for the j
th extension at time t, and 0
otherwise. Denote, too, the indicator Aijt = 1 if the individual’s spell of unemployment falls before
the announcement of the jth policy change and 0 otherwise. To account for the fact that the filing
dates can be possibly correlated with the unobserved factors which could affect the exit hazards, I
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also control for the filing dates of UI claims, thereby controlling for the comparison is among claims
which filed at similar macro circumstances. The dependent variable is the same as the previous
specifications, Yijt, which is one if individual i leaving UI for a job, and zero otherwise. Using the




) = αI(EUCijt = 1) + βI(Aijt = 1) + δI(EUCijt = 1)I(Aijt = 1) + γnit +Xijt +Mijt + εijt,
(1.19)
where hijt is the probability of exiting UI for employment for individual i in time period t for the j
th
extension (i.e. hijt = Prob(Yijt) = 1). nit controls the used benefit weeks for person i in period t,
Xi is a vector of other controls (such as age, gender and years of schooling), Mit is a set of indicators
for calendar months to control the time effect and εit is the unobserved error term.
Relative to an individual in a UI spell prior to the announcement of the jth policy change
(see Table 1.2), and prior to the start date of EUC eligibility, the effect of being within the relevant
policy window equals P(EUCijt=1, Aijt=0)=α. The relative effect of being in a UI spell after the
announcement of the policy change, and after the date of the EUC eligibility window is equal to
P(EUCijt=0, Aijt=1)=β, and the relative effect of being in a spell after the announcement date
and within the policy window is equal to P(EUCijt=0, Aijt=1)=α+β+γ.
The coefficient on the interaction term is the difference-in-differences estimates. The key
extension effect on hijt can be identified by:
δ ≡(E[ln( hijt
1− hijt
)|EUCi,j,t+1 = 1, Ai,j,t+1 = 1]− E[ln(
hijt
1− hijt
)|EUCi,j,t = 1, Ai,j,t = 0])
− (ln( hkjt
1− hkjt
)|EUCk,j,t+1 = 0, Ak,j,t+1 = 1]− E[ln(
hkjt
1− hkjt
)|EUCk,j,t = 0, Ak,j,t = 0])
(1.20)
If the disincentive effect of the extension dominates, then the δ̂ is expected to be negative.
There are 11 EUC extensions during my sampled period, and hence I apply this specification
in 11 different extension periods. The results are presented in Table 1.8. The coefficient estimates
α̂ are almost negative and significant for every policy change, which indicates that on average the
group of individuals who are eligible for extensions has lower exiting rates. Among those who are not
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eligible for the extensions, the pattern of changes in the probabilities of exiting rates for employment
before and after the new policy announced is not as obvious as the one in the treatment group. In
the latter extension periods, from euc5 through euc10, the estimates of the β are also significant
and negative for the control group. These changes can be due to the effects from the labor market,
instead the extended unemployment insurance.
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Policy Period
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
I(Eligible for EUCj=1) -0.268*** -0.213*** -0.281*** 0.146*** -0.00258 -0.0702*** 0.0093 -0.173*** -0.210*** -0.165*** -0.0824***
(0.035) (0.027) -0.0383 -0.0209 -0.015 -0.0159 -0.0139 -0.0219 -0.0255 -0.0168 -0.0224
I(Announced=1) 0.0485 -0.0399 -0.587*** -0.0817 -0.151** -0.330*** -0.241*** -0.485*** -0.436*** -0.203** 0.245
(0.108) (0.065) (0.074) (0.069) (0.067) (0.103) (0.055) (0.070) (0.081) (0.082) (0.165)
DD estimates -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.489*** -0.765*** -0.469*** -0.605*** -0.683*** -0.779*** -0.365*** -0.625*** 0.289**
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.071) (0.034) (0.045) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.124)
Used benefit wks -0.0257*** -0.0257*** -0.0264*** -0.0263*** -0.0267*** -0.0264*** -0.0270*** -0.0283*** -0.0267*** -0.0264*** -0.0261***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.649*** -2.564*** -1.984*** -2.492*** -2.398*** -2.567*** -2.297*** -1.987*** -2.139*** -2.493*** -2.489***
(0.135) (0.172) (0.176) (0.173) (0.173) (0.159) (0.168) (0.173) (0.178) (0.177) (0.193)
Claims 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504 117,504
Note: See Table 1.2 for a list of the policy periods.
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Figure 1.7: Estimates across Different Extension Periods
The diff-in-diff estimates δ̂ are negative in 10 out of 11 extension periods, and this key
estimator provides evidence that the disincentive effect of the UI extension dominates in almost each
period. Figure 1.7 shows the DD estimates in various extension periods. The pattern implies that
the magnitude increases at the beginning and then decreases as the program extended repeatedly,
which suggests that UI recipients do not respond to the extensions monotonically.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I use administrative data from Kentucky to examine two dimensions of the
effect of the extension of the UI period. My estimates from logit models and other alternative hazard
models indicate that the net effect of extended benefit coverage on unemployment spells is negative,
and hence the disincentive of UI extension dominates at most levels of remaining benefit weeks. I find
that implementing the UI extension decreased exit hazards for jobs by 0.01, which is higher than the
existing studies for the multiple extensions UI but using CPS data. My detailed administrative data
and flexible specifications help me capture the policy variations across individuals and over time,
without putting strong assumptions on the eligibility of the UI recipients, as other studies using CPS
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do. My results suggest that during the Great Recession the supply response of unemployment to
the multiple extensions was not extremely different: the disincentive effect of the UI still dominated
and affected people’s search efforts almost as much as before.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of UI Benefit Level
Changes on the Duration of
Unemployment
2.1 Introduction
Over the course of the Great Recession, the national unemployment rate rose from 6% in the
middle of 2008 to almost 10% in the latter months of 2009. Although the recession ended officially in
June 2009, unemployment remained stubbornly high, and the unemployment rate did not fall below
9% until January 2012, over two years after the Great Recession ended. Even more strikingly, the
long-term unemployment rate1 reached much higher levels (45.5%, the historic high) which persisted
much longer in the Great Recession than in any previous period since the late 1940s. While the
unemployment rate slowly receded after the peak of about 12%, the long-term unemployment rate
remained staggeringly high at more than 39%2, and the mean durations of unemployment reached
40 weeks (historic high) at June 2010, one year after the Great Recession ended.
In addition to the extension of UI periods, weekly benefit levels also increased in Kentucky
over the course of the recession. Unlike most states in the US, the weekly benefit payout eligibility
1The long-term unemployment rate is defined as the share of the unemployed who have been out of work for 27
weeks (six months) or more.
2The highest level in the history was 26%
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in Kentucky is independent of the number of weeks of benefit eligibility. This setting allows me to
distinguish between UI benefit level and the number of weeks of UI entitlement in terms of their
effects on unemployment durations.
Since the UI benefit level is determined by eligible unemployed workers’ prior earnings,
conventional identification strategies usually encounter endogeneity issues. As has been noted in
recent studies (Nielsen et al. (2010)3 and Simonsen et al. (2010)), using the kinks in the benefit
policy provides the possibility for identifying the effect of the policy variable, while overcoming the
traditional endogeneity issue, even in the absence of traditional instruments. I identify the effect
of UI weekly benefit level by adopting the Regression Kink Design (RKD), formally developed by
Card et al. (2012), using the kinks in the schedule of UI benefits. My estimates suggest that the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level is in the range of 0.2 to 0.5,
and hence the increase of maximum UI benefit level (from $401 to $440) raises the unemployment
duration for the median person4 by 0.33 to 0.83 weeks. Moreover, my estimates indicate that the
effect of unemployment insurance benefits could vary over the lifecycle, and the duration elasticity
is smaller when the unemployment rate is relatively high.
2.2 Studies of the effect of Unemployment Benefit on the
Duration of Unemployment in the U.S.
Among the studies which investigate the effect of benefit level on unemployment duration,
it is typical to regress the durations on the benefit level. However, the weekly benefit is a constant
fraction of previous earnings (when the qualified benefit level is smaller than the cap), and hence
such regressions cannot distinguish between the effect of UI and the highly correlated influence of
previous earnings. In addition, other sources of differences in benefits, such as family composition
and allowances for dependents, are also likely to have dependent effects on unemployment spells.
To overcome this traditional endogeneity issue, a growing literature considers identifying models
with endogenous regressors conditional on a suitable control function. But this identification hinges
on the existence of one or more “instrument” variables that are assumed to be independent of
3The Regression Kink Design (RKD) was first introduced by Nielsen et al. (2010) to identify the causal effect of
financial aid on college enrollment.
4Using the median of unemployment durations in the US at the beginning of the Great Recession, which was 17
weeks
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the errors in the regression functions. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find appropriate instruments
that satisfy valid assumptions particularly when the regressor of interest is a policy variable. The
level of unemployment benefits, for example, is typically set by a formula that depends on previous
earnings. In such settings individual characteristics that affect the benefit level could also correlated
with any unobserved determinants of previous earnings, and hence are correlated with unemployment
duration.
Another approach to identifying the benefit effect uses exogenous variation from policy
changes: for example, the sharp discontinuities in the potential duration of benefit entitlements
by age. Such identification of a causal effect (Regression Discontinuity Design) relies on a discrete
change or a jump in the treatment probability, and yet fails or is weak when there is no discontinuity,
or when the discontinuity is small (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). In the context of the US benefit
schedule, no such policy discontinuity exists; instead, the unemployment benefit level is determined
by a formula which is a fixed fraction of prior-job earnings and subject to a maximum amount.
As has been noted in recent studies (Nielsen et al. (2010)5 and Simonsen et al. (2010)),
the existence of a kinked policy rule provides the possibility for identifying the effect of the policy
variable, even in the absence of traditional instruments. Essentially, the Regression Kink Design
(RKD) looks for an induced kink in the outcome variable that coincides with the kink in the policy
rule and relates the relative magnitudes of the two kinks. By applying RKD, one can still identify a
policy effect even if there is no discontinuity in the policy, provided there is a kink, or a slope change
in the assignment variable in the continuous treatment.
Card et al. (2012) formally considers nonparametric identification of the average marginal
effect of a continuous endogenous treatment variable in a generalized nonseparable model, where the
treatment of interest is a continuous but kinked function of an observed assignment variable. A valid
RKD is achieved by assuming that, conditional on the unobservable determinants of the outcome
variable, the density of the assignment variable is smooth at the kink point in the policy rule
(established in Card et al. (2012)). This crucial assumption rules out the possible endogenous issue
that the agents can deterministically manipulate the value of the assignment variables in the policy
formula. For example, a kink in the marginal tax schedule would be expected to lead to taxpayers
bunching up at the level of income associated with the kink. Such an endogenous issue could lead
5The Regression Kink Design (RKD) was first introduced by Nielsen et al. (2010) to identify the causal effect of
financial aid on college enrollment.
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to a non-smooth distribution of unobserved heterogeneity around the kink point. Therefore, under
the smooth density condition, the endogenous chosen concern can be solved. Following the RD
design (Lee and Lemieux (2010)), RKD validity is testable. In contrast to the traditional approach,
RKD predicts that predetermined characteristics are irrelevant and unnecessary for identification,
and hence RKD can avoid making any strong assumptions about which characteristics should be
included in the analysis.
2.3 The Unemployment Insurance System In Kentucky
UI benefit is based on a formula that depends on the claimant’s labor market activities in
the period before becoming unemployed. This period, defined as the base period, is traditionally the
first four completed calendar quarters out of five immediately preceding the start of the claim.6 The
weekly benefit rate payable to a compensated unemployed person is an amount equal to 1.3078% of
his earnings in the base period, provided this is not more than the maximum amount.
During my study period, benefit level changed three time. The maximum weekly benefit
rose from $401 in 2006 to $415 in 2007, and all claims filed after December 21, 2008 received extra
$25 every week. Hence, claimants who had not exhausted their UI benefit before the end of 2008
would have more benefit before exhaustion than the amount determined at the start of the claim.
Let b denote “weekly benefit amount” and let E1−4 is the sum of the quarterly earnings in the base
period. The rules that determine b are:
b2006−2007 =

1.3078%∗(E1−4), if E1−4 ≤ $30662.18.
$401, if E1−4 > $30662.18.
b2007−2009 =

1.3078%∗(E1−4), if E1−4 ≤ $31732.68.
$415, if E1−4 > $31732.68.
b2009−2011 =

1.3078%∗(E1−4) + $25, if E1−4 ≤ $31732.68.
$440, if E1−4 > $31732.68.
6During the sampled period, Kentucky was one of a dozen states that had not adopted the Alternative Base Period,
which is the most recent four completed quarters prior to unemployment. In most states, individuals who did not
qualify under the conventional method of determining eligibility could be reconsidered using the Alternative Base
Period.
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The amount of weekly benefit does not change once the claim starts, even if the claim is
extended into EUC or EB. Figure 2.1 shows the rule for determining the weekly benefit amount as
a function of base-period earnings. The bottom line corresponds to the rule before 2007, and the
middle line is the rule after 2007 and before 2009. The replacement rates are not changed before
the threshold for the whole sampled period.
In my study, the weekly benefit amount is not a function of the number of weeks claimed.
In contrast, the conventional setting usually involves in two endogenous regressors (weekly benefit
amount and the number of benefit weeks), which are kinked at the same point. But this setting makes
it difficult to distinguish between the independent effects of benefits on unemployment duration and
the effects of the number of weeks of unemployment benefit entitlement on unemployment duration.
Hence, the study in Kentucky would plausibly give a more accurate estimate of the effects of the
weekly benefit amount and benefit durations on the unemployment spells.
2.4 Data
In this paper, I use data drawn from the Kentucky Office of Employment and Training 7.
The administrative data contain quarterly records for each individual filing for UI compensation
from January 2006 through December 2011. The information relevant for my study includes the
number of weeks for each claim; claimants drew benefit from which UI program; the benefit amount
for which each claimant was eligible; the actual amount of benefit they drew; base-period earnings,
and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, employer NAICS code, and years of
schooling.
In addition, I have another important resource for this study is the quarterly wage files, which
cover UI recipients in my sample from 2005 through 2013. The wage file contains detailed information
about these UI claimants before and after they were in the UI programs, including earnings both
before and after their UI spell and major industry sectors. Unlike most of the administrative data
used in previous research, merging the data file helps me to track individuals into their first post-UI
employment spell and permits me to calculate individuals’ unemployment durations and examine
the effects of UI not simply on the probability of exiting UI, but on the probability of finding
employment.
7The data were randomized and anonymous without personal identifiers.
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Notes: The bottom line corresponds to the rule before 2007, and the middle line is the
rule for 2007-2008. The top line represents the rule after December 21, 2008.
Base-period earnings are the sum of earnings over the first four calendar quarters
out of five immediately preceding the start of the claim. Comparing the bottom and
the middle line, the maximum weekly amount increases by $14 and the minimum
base-period earnings that qualify for the maximum amount shifts from $30, 662.18 to
$31, 732.68, as indicated by the two vertical dashed lines. The top line shifts up by $25
from the middle line, and represents the extra $25 added into UI weekly benefit for
every claimant. The threshold of base earnings is still $31, 732.68, and the replacement
rates (the slope of the function before the cutoff) are not changed for the whole sampled
period. The figure only includes observations with base-period earnings less than
$80, 000.
Figure 2.1: UI Benefit Schedule
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Table 1.3 reports summary statistics of variables for the analyzed sample. The sample
includes 71879 displaced workers who files 95365 UI claims.8 Around 13.3% (= 1267695365 ) of claims
were filed before EUC was authorized and were not eligible for the extension. Base-period earnings
increases to $32,476.32 in the group which filed claims after EUC enacted, and yet below the wage
cutoff eligible for the benefit cap.
2.5 Theoretical Model
Conventional search models (Mortensen (1977)) suggest that a higher UI benefits level
reduces incentives for job search, leading to an increase in the expected duration of joblessness.
According to the policy formula, the benefit level is proportionate to the wage of the prior job w−1,
up to some maximum benefit level Bmax. To better capture the benefit effect of the kinked policy,
I develop upon the model of Rothstein (2011), which uses a simplified dynamic job search model
assuming that the duration of unemployment spells is solely determined by unemployed workers’ job
search efforts s in each period, by including the UI benefit level b as one of the state variables.
Following the set up in Rothstein (2011), d represents the remaining benefit weeks. p(s) is
the probability that a claimant finds a job in a period given search effort s, which has p′(s) > 0 and
p′′(s) < 0. The Bellman equation becomes:
VU (b, d) = max
sb,d
u(b)− sb,d + δ[p(sb,d)VE(w−1, b) + (1− p(sb,d))VU (b, d− 1)], where b < Bmax
(2.1)
The first order condition of equation (1) then implies that the search effort choice satisfies:
p′(sb,d) =
1
δ(VE(w−1, b)− VU (b, d− 1))
, where b < Bmax (2.2)
As proved in Rothstein (2011), the value of unemployment, i.e., Vu(b, d), increases with the remaining
benefit weeks d, and decreases with search effort s. It is easy to show that Vu(b, d) increases with
b, and hence with the level of the previous wage w−1, which determines the benefit level, up to
the threshold for the maximum benefit. On the other hand, higher-wage jobs entitle individuals
8In analyzing the effect of extending UI periods, I use all observations in my sample. However in my analysis of the
effect of UI benefits, I exclude observations with censored unemployment durations and wrongly recorded base-period
earnings.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics II
Sample for the study into the effect of UI benefit levels
2006-2007 2007 and After
# of Claims 12,676 82,598
Base-period earnings $29,231.19 $32,476.32
(20,347.23) (23,966.60)
# of Weeks claimed for UI 15.81 27.80
(14.76) (29.85)








Years of Schooling 12.72 12.74
(1.98) (1.95)
# of Sampled unemployed 71,879
# of Claims 95365
Note: The maximum weekly benefit amount for eligible workers was $401 for claims filed in
2006, which then increased to $415. The lowest base-period earnings which qualified for the
maximum benefits were $30,662.18 and $31,732.68, respectively. The weekly benefit rate payable
to a compensated unemployed person is an amount equal to 1.3078% (the replacement rate) of
his earnings in the base period, provided this is not more than the maximum amount.
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to higher benefits, and hence enhance the value of employment with higher payments. Combining
these two effects, the change in p′(sb,d) is uncertain from equation (2), and hence the net effect on
the search effort is ambiguous.
After hitting the threshold for the maximum benefit, i.e. b = Bmax, equation (2) becomes:
p′(sBmax,d) =
1
δ(VE(w−1, Bmax)− VU (Bmax, d− 1))
The value of unemployment is then constant for all higher wages. The incremental benefit stops
for the value of employment once the wage hits the threshold for the maximum UI benefit. Yet
the value of employment continues rising due to increasing preceding job wages. Hence, p′(sBmax,d)
will decline and search effort will increase after reaching the maximum benefit level. All in all, the
chance of leaving UI for jobs will increase.
2.6 Empirical Specifications
The empirical challenge of identifying the effect of changes in UI benefits lies in the difficulty
of finding a credibly exogenous and time invariant source of variations in UI benefits. Most sources
of variations come from changes in legislations over time (Card and Levine (2000), Meyer (1990)).
However, these changes are endogenous to labor market conditions. In this section, I use the kinked
schedule in the relationship between previous earnings and benefit level to estimate the effect of UI
benefits using administrative data from Kentucky. In contrast to traditional studies, mechanism of
Regression Kink Design (RKD) disregards the effects from the labor markets. RKD is an empirical
strategy which has been applied in the economic literature (Nielsen et al. (2010), Card et al. (2015),
Card et al. (2012) and Landais (2013)), and offers valid non-parametric inference of the average
treatment effect in the absence of instruments. I use a model in which the treatment is continuous
and is a known deterministic function of the assignment variable, as in Landais (2013) and Card
et al. (2015).
This type of setting can be characterized as a sharp design in the sense that everyone in the
sample is treated and obeys the same treatment rule. The model is as follows:
Y = y(B,W,X, ε), (2.3)
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where Y is the outcome variable - unemployment duration. B is the continuous treatment variable
- UI weekly benefit level, and determined solely by the assignment variable, W , equal to base
period earnings. X are vectors that are determined prior to W as well as B. For instance, X
include variables, such as ages, years of schooling and gender, which characterize individuals with
C.D.F FX(x). ε is unobservable, non-additive error term
9. If B is binary, then this model is
equivalent to a framework where the “treatment effect” of B for a particular individual is given by
Y1 − Y0 = y(1,W,X, ε) − y(0,W,X, ε). Florens et al. (2008) defines the Average Treatment Effete
(ATE) with respect to the continuous treatment of interest, which is an extension of the ATE in the







where F (W ) is the c.d.f. of W . The integration gives the average value of Y conditional on a
particular pair of value for (b, x, ε). Conventional studies have proposed to use an instrumental
variable (“IV ”) to identify causal parameters. An appropriate instrument variable is assumed to be
correlated with B, and yet independent of the non-additive errors ε. However, when the regressor
of interest is a policy variable which is determined by a endogenous variable, no IV can plausibly
satisfy the “strong and unpalatable” assumptions. In my study, the unemployment benefits B are
calculated as a fixed fraction of wage W up to some maximum benefit, and hence conditional on W
there is no variation in the benefit level. Since wage is correlated with benefit, any variable that is
independent of wage will be independent of the regressor of interest benefit, it is very unlikely to
find instruments for benefit. Inspired by the regression discontinuity design, there are studies which
try to identify a causal effect of B on Y using the kinked benefit rules. The idea is that if benefit
B exerts a casual effect on Y , and there is a kink in the deterministic relation between B and W at
wkink, then there should be an induced kink in the relationship between Y and W at wkink
As shown in Card et al. (2012), when the assignment rule has a kink at W = Wkink, the
following assumptions are required to be satisfied:
Assumptions which make the RKD to be “as good as randomized” experiment:
(1). y1(b(w), w, x) exists for all (b, w, x) ∈ R3, is integrable with respect to FX(x) for all b ∈ R, and
is continuous in b for all x.
9This model allows for completely unrestricted non-additive heterogeneity in the response of Y to B.
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(2). fB|W,X(b|w, x) = fB(b) for all (b, w, x) ∈ R3.
Intuitively, conditional on individuals’ type, their probability of receiving certain amount of
benefit is equal to the probability unconditional on any characteristics. In another word, each person
faces the same possibility of receiving any level of benefit. Given this setting, the randomized exper-
iment becomes that regardless personal characteristics, each individual will be randomly assigned
weekly benefit at different amount, and then the outcome variable Y , unemployment duration, is
observed.
Under the assumptions, Card et al. (2012) shows propositions which indicate that conditional
on receiving certain level on UI benefit, the distribution of X is the same as the distribution for
individuals regardless whether they are UI claimants or how much they receive from UI. Therefore,
the assumptions is testable by examining the distribution of the covariates. The similarity of the
distributions of the covariates with and without the treatment would support the validity of the
RKD. This is an analogue of the conventional way to test whether an experiment is randomized.
Assumptions for the identification of RKD:
(1). y1(b(w), w, x) is continuous in b and y2(b(w), w, x)
10 is continuous in w for all b, w and x.






(w)). Besides, fW |X(0|x) is strictly positive for x ∈ A, where∫
A
dF (x) > 0.
(3). FW |X(w|x) is twice continuously differentiable in W at W = Wkink for every x.
Card et al. (2012) derives propositions based on the required conditions for the identification
of RKD. The proposition states that conditional on the assignment variable W , the rate of change
in the distribution of X is continuous at the kink point wkink. Given this smoothness condition, the
change in the slope of E[Y |W = w] at w = wkink divided by the change in the slope of bW at the
kink point identifies the TTbwkink |wkink . This is the same parameter identified by the randomized
experiment, except that the TTbwkink |wkink is evaluated at B = bwkink and W = wkink. At last,
holding the three assumptions, the pre-determined characteristic X has continuously differentiable
distribution conditional on the assignment variable W over the kink.
The average treatment effect of benefit level on the unemployment duration (ATEb|w) can
10Define y2(b, w, x) ≡ ∂y(b,w,x)∂w
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where B(w) is the benefit schedule which is formulaically determined by w, until w reaches wkink.
The key assumption used here is the ∂E(B(W ),W,X|W=wkink)∂W |b=B(wkink) is continuous at wkink. In-
tuitively, this condition ensures that a marginal change in W around the kink point only affects the
unemployment duration Y through B, since the effects on W or other unobserved heterogeneity are
symmetrically distributed around the kink point, and are eventually canceled out.
The denominator of the estimand, shown in equation (2.5), is determined by the UI schedule,
which is the slope change of the benefit schedule at the kink. In my study, the slope of the benefit
function changes from 0.013078 to 0 at the kink point; the denominator of the RK estimand is
-0.013078. The estimation of the numerator is the change in the slope of the conditional expectation
function of the outcome given the assignment variable at the kink. Using local polynomial estimation
(Fan and Gijbels (1992)), Card et al. (2012) establishes consistency and asymptotic normality of
local linear and local quadratic estimators for sharp kink designs under a set of regularity conditions.




βρ(W−Wkink)ρ+θρ(W−Wkink)ρq(W ≥Wkink)]+ε, where |W−Wkink| ≤ h (2.6)
where Y is the outcome variable, Wkink is the kink point in the benefit schedule, p̄ is the maximum
polynomial order, and h is the bandwidth size that determines the window [Wkink − h,Wkink + h]
within which the sample is selected. The change in the slope of the conditional expectation function
is given by θ1.
Previous literature both the maximum number of UI weeks and the maximum weekly benefit
amount are determined by base-period earnings. The change in base-period earnings around the
kink point can potentially change the benefit amount and the eligible benefit period simultaneously.
In other words, the RK design cannot isolate the marginal effect of the benefit on the total number of
weeks of UI claimed around the kink point. However, in my study such concern is alleviated by the
policy adopted in Kentucky, where the weekly benefit amount is only affected by a change in base-
period earnings during the sample period, while the number of eligible benefit weeks is determined
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by the time when the claimants filed their UI claims. Therefore, a straightforward RKD analysis
will define a behavioral effect on the outcome in my case.
2.7 Graphical Evidence
Except for summarizing data, graphs can usually be used to test the validity of RK design
assumptions. I first test the density of the assignment variable W which must be continuously differ-
entiable at the kink point by plotting the probability density function of the base-period earnings, as
shown in the Figure 2.2. To present these plots, I first divide the base period earnings into suitable
bins, which is chosen by using the formal test of excess smoothing recommended by Lee and Lemieux
(2010). According to the two kinks in the UI benefit schedules, I divide my sample into two groups.
The first one includes all claims filed in 2006 that has the maximum benefit amount $401, and the
second group includes all the rest claims filed after 2007 with maximum weekly benefit $415. Bin
sizes of $2759.6 and $2538.61 are chosen for the two subgroups respectively. 11
Each dot represents the number of observations in every bin correspondingly. Visually,
there are no signs of discontinuity in the relationship between the number of observations and the
assignment variable around the kink point. Even though the plot of 2006-2007 contains a bump
on the right of the kink, the points go smoothly through the kink point. Statistically, the results
from McCrary test, which is a standard test in the Regression Discontinuity Design literature, also
confirm this conclusion. The estimate for the log changes in height of observations around the kink
point and their bootstrapped standard errors are displayed on the graph. For the plot of 2006-2007,
the Z-test statistics is -1.42 (= −0.1/0.07), which supports the continuous assumption on a 90%
confidence interval. For the other plot of 2007 and after, the Z-test statistics is 0.67 (0.02/0.03),
which even more strongly support the assumption.
As done in Card et al. (2012), the McCrary test can be extended into a test for violation
of the continuity of the derivative, by regressing the number of observations Ni in each bin on




βi(W −Wkink)ρi + θ(W −Wkink)i q (W ≥Wkink) + ε (2.7)
11Both of these bin sizes are the largest that pass the tests suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010)
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Figure 2.2: Density of Base Period Earnings
(a) (b)
The coefficient of the interaction term θ tests the change in slope of the p.d.f. As reported in
Figure 2.2, the estimates θ are 261.59 with standard error 253, and 1121.7 with standard error 1315,
for 2006-2007 and after 2007 respectively, which suggest there is insignificant discontinuity in the
derivative of the conditional density at the kink.
Second, the conditional expectation of any covariates should be continuously differentiable
at the kink. This condition can be visually examined by plotting the mean values of covariates for
observations in each bin against the assignment variable. In Figures 2.3 and 2.4, I show plots of
conditional means of ages, years of education, the fraction of males, and the fraction of whites for
different bins of base-period earnings in two subgroups that filed UI claims before and after 2007.
All these covariates are predetermined before base-period earnings. The pattern of the years of
education in Figure 2.3(b) is slightly bumpy to the left of the kink, but the magnitude of the jump
is negligible. The mean values of age in claims after 2007 (Figure 2.4(a)) suggest some evidence of a
kink to the right of the kink, but no strong visual evidence of discontinuities in the first derivative
of the mean values at the kink point. Conducting the McCrary test, as in Figure 2.2, and the result
confirms this conclusion. Inspections of all these plots suggest that the conditional means of the
covariates go though the kink points smoothly, which supports the identification assumption of RK
design.
Typically, the RKD analysis results can be summarized by the graphs as well. The potential
kinks between the outcome variable of interest and the assignment variable – base-period earnings
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Figure 2.5: Mean values of outcome variable
(a) (b)
Notes: Each circle represents the weight-scaled mean in each bin of unemployment durations. The horizontal line
represents the relative changes in prior earnings comparing to earnings on the threshold.
– are expected to be visualized around the kink points indicated in the formula. For two different
subsamples, I plot the mean values in each bin of the outcome of interest, i.e. unemployment
duration, against the assignment variable (presented in Figure 2.5). I limit my observation of base-
period earnings with a range from 0 to $61324.36 for the first subgroup and $63465.36 for the second
subgroup. These make the kink points of the base period earnings of $30662.18 and $31732.68 to be
in the middle of each plot. The sharp changes in the slopes of the relationship between the outcome
variables and the assignment variables at the kink points are observed in every plot. In each one,
the outcome variables increase as the the assignment variable approaching to the kink point from
the left, and then decrease as the assignment variable moving further to the right of the threshold.
Figure 2.2(a) shows a more disturbing pattern for dots on the right of the kink, and the fitted line is
less steep than the corresponding ones in other plots. Yet, there is still a clearly discernible change
in the slope of the relationship between the two variables at the kink-point. All in all, these figures
provide supportive evidence for the identification of an effect of benefit level on the unemployment
duration in the RK design.
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2.8 Estimation Results
Table 2.2 reports the effects on unemployment duration of the specification (2.6) with covari-
ates. The point estimates of θ1 represent the marginal impact of an extra dollar of prior-job weekly
earnings on the average log unemployment durations. The elasticity of unemployment duration with








where the numerator is the point estimate θ1 from equation (2.6), and the denominator is the inverse
of the Wkink.
I report the estimates from regressions up to a second order polynomial. The standard error
are presented under each of the estimates. For each specification, the bandwidth is chosen based on
the “rule-of-thumb” optimal bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).12
Comparing the estimates from groups which filed claims in 2006 and after 2007, unemploy-
ment duration elasticity with respect to benefits decreases significantly in the local linear specifi-
cation. In 2006, increasing weekly benefits levels by 1% would increase unemployment duration by
0.52%, while increasing unemployment duration by 0.15 % for individuals who filed claims after
2007. The distinction between these two groups is the change in the maximum weekly benefit, from
$401 to $415, and the corresponding thresholds of the minimum yearly earnings that could be eli-
gible for the maximum weekly benefit, from $30662.18 to $31732.68. For the other weekly benefit
change, which happened on December 21, 2008, every claim was given an extra $25 each week, and
yet the kink point in the benefit schedule is unchanged. To further inspect the benefit effect, I divide
the sample which filed claims after 2007 into two subgroups, from 2007 to 2009 and after 2009. As
shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2, the estimates of unemployment elasticity from the linear
specification decrease from 0.22 to 0.18, as the weekly benefit increased by $25 for every claimant.











The density f(c) and variance σ2(c) are estimated by assuming that the density and conditional variance functions
are continuous at the threshold c. The second derivative m̂
(2)
+ (c) is estimated by fitting a quadratic function to
the observations with Xi ∈ [c, c + h], and similarly m̂
(2)
− (c) is estimated by fitting a quadratic function to the
observations with Xi ∈ [c− h, c]. CK is a constant that depends on the kernel used. For the triangular kernel, with
K(u) = (1− |u|) ∗ I(|u| ≤ 1), the constant is 3.4375.
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Table 2.2: RKD estimate of UI benefit on Unemployment Durations
2006 2007 and After 2007 - 2008 2009 and After
Local Linear
θ̂1 −8.878× 10−4 −2.389× 10−4 −3.635× 10−4 −2.928× 10−4
(1.854× 10−4) (2.217× 10−4) (1.337× 10−4) (2.162× 10−4)
P–value 0.8044 0.3753 0.1174 0.9373
AIC 29891 103524 70151 36425
Elasticity 0.5235 0.1458 0.2218 0.1787
(0.1093) (0.1353) (0.0816) (0.1319)
Bandwidth 28784 12142 21982 18233
# Obs 9534 31484 23036 11853
Local Quadratic
θ̂1 −2.27× 10−4 1.64× 10−5 6.62× 10−4 −7.639× 10−4
(5.638× 10−4) (2.962× 10−4) (3.905× 10−4) (3.503× 10−4)
P–value 0.0156 0.9699 0.5100 0.8230
AIC 30613 187054 77162 52912
Elasticity 0.1338 -0.0100 -0.4040 0.4662
(0.3324) (0.1808) (0.2383) (0.2138)
Bandwidth 35618 27128 26994 49857
# Obs 9762 56826 25309 17097
Note: The point estimates of θ̂1 represent the marginal impact of an extra dollar of
prior-job weekly earnings on the average log unemployment durations over the kink. The
bandwidth is chosen based on the “rule-of-thumb” optimal bandwidth from Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Smaller (lower than 0.05) p-values from Goodness-of-Fit tests
suggest that the estimates from the corresponding specifications are robust against the
choice of bin size at a 95% confidence interval. Among different polynomial models for
each group, the smaller AIC suggests the order preferred.
The maximum weekly benefit (kink point) shifts from$401 to $415 from the 2006 group
to the 2007 and after group, while the benefit schedule shifts up by $25 each week for
claims filed in and after 2009 compared with claims filed in 2007 and 2008.
55
To closely inspect the relationship between elasticity estimates and bandwidth, in Figure 2.6
I plot the local linear estimates (the best specifications according to the AIC) for different samples
associated with a range of bandwidths from $100 to $1000 weekly prior-job earnings. As expected,
the RKD does poorly with small samples, and the estimates become more precise as the bandwidth
increases, while the standard errors get smaller. At the optimal bandwidth, the elasticity estimate
for claims in 2006 is much bigger than the elasticity estimate for claims in 2007 and after. However,
as the bandwidth increases, the elasticity estimates from the two groups converge. The elasticity in
the group after 2007 converges to 0.45 after a bandwidth of $400. In contrast, the elasticity estimates
for claims in 2007-2009 are always larger than those in the group for claims after 2009. The pattern
is more striking after the chosen optimal bandwidth. In general, the optimal bandwidth produces
the most meaningful estimates.
Table 2.2 presents p-values from a Goodness-of-Fit test and Aikake Information Criterion
(AIC) for each specification. In each group, none of the p-values is less than 0.05 in any of the
linear specifications13, which suggests that the linear specification is not sensitive to the inclusion
of the bin dummies, and hence the estimates are robust against choosing different bin sizes. The
reported AIC, which is used to select the preferred order of the polynomial, suggest that the linear
specification is dominated in every group.14
It is notable that in Table 2.2, the inclusion of the quadratic term causes the marginal effect
of the weekly benefit level on the unemployment duration θ̂1 to change signs and become statistically
insignificant for subgroup which filed claims after 2007 and for subgroup which filed claims in 2007-
2009. There is a lot of curvature before the kink point, which is captured by fitting the quadratic
term. The linear trend corrected the over-fitted curvature by the quadratic term after the kink.
Since the trend of unemployment durations become flatter after the kink point relative to the trend
before the kink point, the estimates of the linear term θ̂1 become positive.
To more accurately obtain labor supply effects with respect to unemployment durations, I
investigate the effect of different UI claimant characteristics. The estimates are generally consistent
across demographic groups, except for the age group. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between
unemployment duration and base-period earnings among people under 26 years old. For claimants
13The p-values are from a Goodness-of-Fit test that compares the polynomial model to the same polynomial model
with a series of bin dummies.
14My conclusion can be limited by the bandwidth chosen. Landais (2013) shows that the larger the bandwidth, the
less likely the linear specification will dominate higher order polynomials.
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Figure 2.7: Unemployment Durations for Different Age Groups
(a) (b)
above kink points with maximum benefits, unemployment durations increase as prior-earnings rise,
and the increasing rates are even higher than the observations below the kink points. This pattern is
the opposite of that observed across the entire sample (as shown in Figure 2.5): As the replacement
rate drops over the kink, the opportunity cost of staying unemployed increases, and hence the
unemployment duration does not drop sharply at the exact point of the cutoff, but rapidly decreases
over a narrow range of values just below the cutoff, as predicted in the proposition. Table 2.3
shows the RKD estimates for the two age groups. The estimates are consistent across different
specifications. The AIC suggests that the linear estimates dominate in each period.
Unlike older people, typical young people without long work histories would have had less
access to loans in the past, and hence have a lower stock of debt. Therefore young people’s liquidity
constraints are lower. As long as the UI benefit covers young people’s basic living expenses, they
are more patient about searching for and accepting new jobs. In addition, young people have lower
human capital depreciation rates than old people, and will generally tend to wait for a “better”
job which could help them improve their lifetime career prospects and build up human capital,
the marginal return of which is also higher for young people. This is even more true for young
unemployed people who used to earn high wages (higher than the kinked scheduled wages) and tend
to have higher expectations about their future jobs. High-earning youth unemployed people would
also have a smaller market due to the high skill levels they possess, and they may also overestimate
their skills and mismatch themselves with the market. Combining all these effects, young people’s
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unemployment durations can increase along with the prior-earnings. It is also noticeable that the
marginal increase could be higher for higher-earning unemployed young people than lower-earning
ones. Table 2.3 shows the estimates of elasticities for the young and old age groups, and the estimates
for the young group are always negative across different periods and different specifications. These
markedly different estimates from different age groups suggest that the effect of unemployment
insurance benefit could vary over the lifecycle.
Generally, my estimates range from 0.2 to 0.5, which are at the lower end of estimates in the
literature on US data: Chetty (2008) indicates that the elasticity of UI benefit on unemployment
duration is between 0.7 and 1; Meyer (1990) finds an elasticity of 0.56. One explanation is that
I have employed a new method, RKD, which is different from the analysis used in conventional
studies, and intend to solve the traditional policy endogeneity issue. The generosity of UI usually
increases when unemployment is high, and hence policy endogeneity will make unemployment dura-
tion elasticity artificially larger during times of high unemployment. In the next section, I conduct
the analysis using the traditional method, and the results are larger than my RKD estimates. In
addition, my estimates are closer to Landais (2013), which also uses RKD to estimate unemployment
duration elasticity with respect to benefit level. As suggested by Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) and
Schmieder et al. (2012), the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits could be different over the
business cycle. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011) uses different simulation strategies to solve the policy
endogeneity issue and finds that the duration elasticity is smaller when the local unemployment
rate is relatively high. This is supported by my empirical results and will be discussed in the next
section.
2.9 Robustness Check
2.9.1 Comparison to the results from Hazard model
The biggest concern with using the traditional hazard model in the UI study is endogeneity,
and the common way to mitigate it is to add a set of controls. In Table 2.4, I present the estimates
of the effect of UI weekly benefit levels on the hazard rate of exiting UI for jobs from 5 different
specifications with various controls, using the sample after 2007. Generally, the estimates from
traditional hazard models are higher than the estimates from RKD as discussed before.
In all of them, I include controls for gender, ethnicity, age, industries, years of schooling,
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Table 2.3: Estimates for different age groups
2006 2007 and After 2007 - 2008 2009 and After
Young(≤26)
Local Linear
θ̂1 1.437 × 10−4 1.3455 × 10−3 8.253 × 10−4 6.351 × 10−4
(6.006 × 10−4) (4.167 × 10−4) (4.615 × 10−4) (4.557 × 10−4)
Elasticity -0.0847 -0.8211 -0.5036 -0.3875
(0.3541) (0.2543) (0.2816) (0.2781)
# Obs 1683 6256 3449 2640
AIC 5301 20628 10787 8230
Local Quadratic
θ̂1 9.297 × 10−4 3.0476 × 10−3 2.4894 × 10−3 9.291 × 10−4
(1.8416 × 10−3) (7.414 × 10−4) (9.26 × 10−4) (1.2014 × 10−3)
Elasticity -0.5482 -1.8598 -1.5191 -0.5670
(1.0859) (0.4524) (0.5651) (0.7331)
# Obs 1688 10345 4763 3061
AIC 5320 34216 14965 9577
Old(>26)
Local Linear
θ̂1 −4.71 × 10−4 −8.809 × 10−4 −3.569 × 10−4 −1.643 × 10−4
(1.385 × 10−4) (1.204 × 10−4) (9.83 × 10−5) (1.748 × 10−4)
Elasticity 0.2777 0.5375 0.2178 0.1003
(0.0817) (0.0735) (0.0600) (0.1067)
# Obs 8419 40693 21840 11545
AIC 24256 133533 63007 35363
Local Quadratic
θ̂1 −2.19 × 10−5 −5.441 × 10−4 −1.49 × 10−5 −7.881 × 10−4
(6.433 × 10−4) (2.856 × 10−4) (3.893 × 10−4) (4.585 × 10−4)
Elasticity 0.0129 0.3320 0.0091 0.4809
(0.3793) (0.1743) (0.2376) (0.2798)
# Obs 7919 48097 21052 13218
AIC 26692 157704 66575 40647
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Table 2.4: Use Cox-proportional Hazard Models to estimate the effect of UI benefit
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I(Remaining benefit week>0) -1.192*** -1.177*** -1.178*** -1.182*** 2.519***
(0.0945) (0.0937) (0.0937) (0.0938) (0.3760)
Remaining Benefit weeks -0.00665*** -0.00649*** -0.00647*** -0.00652*** -0.00617*
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0035)
ln benefit -0.318*** -0.676*** -0.657***
(0.0457) (0.0744) (0.0744)
ln wages 0.355*** 0.276*** 0.355*** 0.285***
(0.0530) (0.0622) (0.0532) (0.0470)




















New Claim Rates -12.01 -11.85 -11.77 -11.92 -11.22
(11.64) (11.63) (11.63) (11.63) (11.63)
Constant 0.948 -0.655 -0.00505 -0.598 -0.4009
(0.5830) (0.5910) (0.6590) (0.6480) (0.5740)
Observations 362,839 362,839 362,839 362,839 362,839
LR test of Gamma LR test of Gamma LR test of Gamma LR test of Gamma LR test of Gamma
chibar2=8.9961 Chibar2=36.21 Chibar2=37.24 Chibar2=37.308 chibar2=32.7191
P-value=0.001357 P-value=8.9E-010 P-value=5.8E-010 P-value=5.10E-010 P-value=5.3E-009
Note: In these specifications, I control for fixed time effects for calendar month, three-order polynomial insured unemploy-
ment rates, three-order polynomial new UI claims rates, and baseline hazard. I treat the baseline hazard non-parametrically
by creating 100 interval-specific dummy variables (one for each week at risk), as the longest observed UI spell in my data
set is 99 weeks and the shortest is 0. ***(**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5
Male 0.306*** 0.263*** 0.261*** 0.265*** 0.252***
(0.0387) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0365)
White 0.0439 0.026 0.0259 0.0251 0.0256
(0.0541) (0.0529) (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0509)
Age
22-31 -0.374*** -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.344*** -0.337***
(0.0770) (0.0750) (0.0751) (0.0753) (0.0726)
32-41 -0.514*** -0.500*** -0.501*** -0.502*** -0.487***
(0.0813) (0.0793) (0.0794) (0.0796) (0.0770)
42-51 -0.684*** -0.680*** -0.681*** -0.682*** -0.661***
(0.0831) (0.0812) (0.0812) (0.0814) (0.0791)
52-62 -1.047*** -1.041*** -1.041*** -1.044*** -1.013***
(0.0893) (0.0872) (0.0871) (0.0874) (0.0854)
Years of Education
8 -0.0936 -0.0505 -0.0387 -0.0513 -0.0702
(0.1930) (0.1890) (0.1890) (0.1900) (0.1820)
9 -0.142 -0.101 -0.0908 -0.101 -0.0984
(0.1390) (0.1360) (0.1360) (0.1360) (0.1300)
11 -0.158* -0.115 -0.108 -0.116 -0.12
(0.0949) (0.0929) (0.0931) (0.0933) (0.0894)
12 0.107** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.129***
(0.0486) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0462)
15 0.088 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.0999
(0.0874) (0.0854) (0.0855) (0.0857) (0.0825)
16 0.260*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.213*** 0.208***
(0.0717) (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0707) (0.0683)
18 0.279** 0.167 0.168 0.17 0.17
(0.1260) (0.1250) (0.1250) (0.1250) (0.1210)
20 0.0144 -0.137 -0.126 -0.133 -0.12
(0.4270) (0.4200) (0.4200) (0.4210) (0.4070)
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5
Industry
Accom.-Food Services 0.912** 0.737* 0.736* 0.736* -0.418
(0.4290) (0.4210) (0.4210) (0.4220) (0.4130)
Agriculture 0.652 0.573 0.577 0.569 -0.396
(0.4100) (0.4030) (0.4030) (0.4040) (0.6360)
Construction 0.407 0.315 0.327 0.311 0.137
(0.4130) (0.4050) (0.4060) (0.4060) (0.1510)
Finance and Insurance 0.587 0.526 0.532 0.523 -0.119
(0.4120) (0.4050) (0.4050) (0.4060) (0.1540)
Health Care -0.0172 -0.0772 -0.0668 -0.0833 0.102
(0.4240) (0.4170) (0.4170) (0.4180) (0.1600)
Management of Companies and Enterprises 0.092 0.0376 0.0538 0.0327 -0.0374
(0.4260) (0.4180) (0.4180) (0.4190) (0.1670)
Manufacturing 0.357 0.272 0.283 0.269 -0.361*
(0.4120) (0.4050) (0.4050) (0.4060) (0.1910)
Mining 0.589 0.379 0.401 0.374 -0.138
(0.4510) (0.4430) (0.4440) (0.4440) (0.1610)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 0.156 0.105 0.118 0.0969 -0.0471
(0.4560) (0.4480) (0.4480) (0.4490) (0.1500)
Public Administration 0.586 0.528 0.545 0.526 -0.303
(0.4100) (0.4030) (0.4030) (0.4040) (0.2460)
Real Estate -Rental and Leasing 0.0535 0.0144 0.0252 0.01 0.105
(0.4260) (0.4180) (0.4190) (0.4200) (0.1550)
Retail Trade 0.659 0.604 0.612 0.603 -0.380**
(0.4080) (0.4010) (0.4020) (0.4020) (0.1930)
Transportation and Warehousing 0.489 0.436 0.449 0.432 0.186
(0.4110) (0.4040) (0.4040) (0.4050) (0.1520)
Utilities 0.581 0.559 0.576 0.557 0.0217
(0.4910) (0.4820) (0.4830) (0.4840) (0.1580)
Wholesale Trade 0.507 0.42 0.431 0.416 0.132
(0.4340) (0.4260) (0.4260) (0.4270) (0.3000)
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new claims rates, and calendar month fixed effects. Coefficient estimates for lnb in the proportional
hazard models can be interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard rates with respect to the weekly
benefit. Presumably, the exit hazard rate is constant, and hence the unemployment duration is the
inverse of it. Y = 1Exit Hazard . The elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the weekly






∂lnb = −ελ, where the Y is the unemployment
duration and λ is the exit hazard rate.
In the first specification, as shown in the first column of Table 2.4, the elasticity estimate
of exit hazard is -0.318 (The corresponding elasticity of unemployment duration is 0.318), which
is larger than the RKD estimated elasticity of unemployment duration 0.15, shown in Table 2.2
Column 2. The traditional endogeneity issue would be concerned in the first specification due to
the fact that the benefit is determined by the prior earnings. In the second specification, I include
the log-base-period earnings, and the elasticity estimate increase to -0.676, which is slightly bigger
than the upper bound of the RKD estimates (-0.45) conditional on the bandwidth bigger than $400.
After adding in an interaction term of log benefit with over the kink, the coefficient of the lnb
doesn’t change much, shown in the Table 2.4 Column 3, but the coefficient of the interaction term
is positive. The positive estimate implies that for claimants who used to earn wages higher than the
cut off $31732.68, a increment of the weekly benefit would increase their possibility of finding jobs,
and lower the unemployment duration. This is consistent with the pattern in Figure 2.5(b).
It is worth mentioning that the Great Recession is documented from December 2007 to
June 2009, which coincides with when the kink in benefit schedules shifted (2007) and when a
lump sum amount of benefit was added into each claim (2009). Since UI generosity, in terms of
both benefit level and duration, varied with the business cycle, the estimates from different periods
might include effects from cyclical changes.15 To detect the cyclical effect, in one of my hazard
model specifications, I include interaction terms of log benefit with different unemployment rates,
as show in column(4). My results suggest that the negative effect of the benefit level on the exit
hazards decreases as unemployment rates increases. This is consistent with my RKD results from
two subgroups of claims filed between 2007-2009 (with unemployment rates 6% - 7%) and claims
filed after 2009 (with unemployment rates 7% - 11%). The RKD estimates decrease significantly
from the earlier period to the later period, which indicates that as the recession got worse and
unemployment grew, the elasticity of the unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level
15See Schmieder et al. (2012) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011).
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decreased as well.
2.9.2 Check the location of the kink
Since RKD relies on the pattern of the data around the kink point to identify the treatment
effect, the RKD estimate might include some outliers in the relationship between the assignment
variable W and the outcomes Y . These outliers disturb the estimated results. Following Landais
(2013), I conduct a robustness test to detect the location of the kink which would minimize the
residual sum of squares or, equivalently, maximize R-squared. In principle, the “empirical kink”
should be coincident with the real kink in the benefit schedule, and hence it is worth seeing whether
the two kinks are the same in my study. The test is conducted by running the RKD specification,
equation (4.6), for multiple choices of kink points, and then comparing the corresponding R-squared
from changing the location of the kink point. Figure 2.8 shows the R-squared against the location of
the kink point. The dashed line shows the location of the real kink, indicated by the benefit schedule.
The R-squared increases sharply as the tested kink location approaches the real kink location, and
then slumps. Even though after the tested kink $41232.68 ($ 9,500 at the right of the real kink
$31732.68) the R-squared increases again, the bandwidth ( $21573.46 ) includes more than 51,000
out of 59,940 observations in the sample. Since the majority of observations are covered in the
regressions with large bandwidth, the effect from the outliers is mitigated and R-squared increases
subsequently. The kink point that maximizes R-squared is located at the real kink point, and this
provides strong evidence for the validity of the RKD.
2.10 Conclusion
In this paper, I use administrative data from Kentucky to examine two dimensions of the
effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration during the Great Recession. Using the kinks in the
schedule of UI benefits, I identify the effect of UI benefit by adopting RKD analysis. My estimates
suggest the elasticity of unemployment spells with respect to benefit level lies in the range from 0.2
to 0.5, which is on the lower end of estimates from the existing literature on US data. Since the
traditional methods do not effectively solve the policy endogeneity issue, and the unemployment
duration elasticity is artificially larger during times of high unemployment. My result can be treated
as evidence that RKD could theoretically solve the traditional endogeneity issue, and hence the
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of R2
Notes: The horizontal line represents the relative position of the tested kink against
the real kink in the benefit schedule, which is indicated by the dashed line. The real
kink is $31732.68.
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policy effect derived from this method is presumably lower than conventional studies suggest.
My results also suggest that the cyclical effect of the disincentive effect of benefit level on
unemployment duration decreases as unemployment rates increase, which coincides with conclusions
in Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), Schmieder et al. (2012) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011).
It worth mentioning that in my study youth unemployment exhibits quite different un-
employment duration patterns than for workers older than 26: As the replacement rate drops,





Appendix A Literature Review
The most recent literature, which investigates the effects of the extended UI benefits on
the labor market, uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The CPS visits a given address
(housing unit) for four months, does not interview for eight months, and revisits the address for
four more months. This sample structure allows researchers to match households in consecutive
months up to three times. As confirmed in both Farber and Valletta (2013) and Rothstein (2011),
the unemployment durations implied by the frequency and duration structure of exits from unem-
ployment are much lower than the reported durations of spells in progress in the CPS cross-section.
To deal with the spurious exits from unemployment, both papers recode the intervening month as a
continuation of the initial unemployment spell. For instance, for individuals who report a transition
out of unemployment in month one followed by an entry back to unemployment in month three
(i.e. UEU or UNU, where U unemployment, E employment, and N non-labor force), both papers
recode the middle month as U unemployment. Since the structure of the CPS data doesn’t allow
researchers to match households after the fourth month, the recoding method cannot be applied
to individuals who transit out of unemployment in month four. In another word, imposing this
adjustment to observed transitions requires restricting the set of observations to those from the first
two of each set of four consecutive CPS rotation groups. To have complete information, only at least
two subsequent matched observations are sampled and each individual needs to be observed at least
3 of four months in both papers.
As opposed to these two papers, Fujita (2011) uses a different method to deal with the same
issue. When a worker is unemployed for two consecutive months, the CPS procedure automatically
assumes that the worker is continuously unemployed with no intra-month employment spell. When
a worker reported employed or NILF (Not In the Labor Force) in the previous month’s survey, the
worker cannot logically be unemployed for more than 5 weeks if he reports that he is unemployed in
this month. When this logical inconsistency is observed in the data (for example, a worker reports
that his unemployment duration is 26 weeks even though he reported NILF in the previous month’s
survey), Fujita (2011) assume that the previous month’s labor market status was misreported, and
corrected data by assuming the worker with an inconsistent transition to be unemployed in the
previous month.
Due to the fact of losing direct information in the CPS on UI eligibility, and most papers
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rely on the reported reason for unemployment to measure the eligibility. Unemployed individuals
who report having lost a job as the reason for unemployment are, in principle, eligible to receive UI.
In contrast, individuals who report voluntarily leaving a job or new-entry into the labor force are, in
principle, not eligible to receive UI. Both Farber and Valletta (2013) and Rothstein (2011) classify
unemployed Job Losers as the UI-eligible group, and Job Leavers and new labor force entrants as
UI-ineligible group.
Each March, the regular monthly CPS is accompanied by an extensive set of supplemental
questions regarding income in the previous calendar year, and UI is identified as a source of income.
The rotating sample structure of the CPS enables matching of observations on unemployed individ-
uals for selected months in year t with the information on their income receipt in year t recorded
in the year t + 1 March supplement. Based on this match, Farber and Valletta (2013) provides
fractions of unemployed individuals from monthly CPS who report receiving annual UI income in
subsequent matched March CPS for both UI-eligible group and UI-ineligible group. The percentage
of the UI-eligible who report receiving UI income reached about 50 percent, while the percentage of
the UI-ineligible group is about 5-10 percent. This fact is also confirmed by Rothstein (2011). Only
half of individuals sampled in both papers are actual UI claimants, and there is high chance that
the estimates are largely biased.
Rothstein (2011) matches over 70% of monthly respondents to employment statuses in the
following month, measures the one-month-later employment outcomes for roughly 4,000 unemployed
workers, and constructs monthly reemployment rates and labor force exit rates. All these sampled
workers, who are observed to exit unemployment in one month but return the following month, have
at least two subsequent interviews. Given the assumption that all displaced workers are eligible for
full benefits, Rothstein (2011) simulates remaining benefit durations for each of them.
According to weekly dates of the availability of EUC and EB benefits for different states,
Rothstein (2011) computes the eligibility for benefits in each week between the time of being unem-
ployed and the time of initial interviews, and the available benefit weeks decrease one week by each
week, while assuming that individuals anticipate no further legislative changes of benefits.
Using the matched CPS data, Rothstein (2011) assumes that the monthly hazard of leaving
unemployment follows a logistic function. Let λist be the probability that the individual i in state
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) = θDist + Pn(nist; γ) + PZ(Zst; δ) + αs + ηt, (9)
where Dist the total number of weeks of benefits available to individual i, including the nist weeks
already used as well as weeks she expects to be able to draw in the future, and Zst is a measure
of economic conditions. αs and ηt are fixed effects for states and months, Pn and PZ are flexible
polynomials.
Since the UI got extended when the labor market became worse, and the total number
of benefit weeks available to each person varies with labor demand conditions, Rothstein (2011)
proposes several strategies to identify the different components of the variation in the benefit weeks,
which are exogenous to unobserved determinants of the unemployment hazard.
The first strategy aims at absorbing labor demand condition through including a cubic
polynomial function PZ , in the state unemployment rates. The remaining variation in the total
number of benefit weeks primarily comes from the repeated expiration and renewal of the EUC,
and whether the EB are triggered in different states. Usually, the extension of benefits corresponds
to the weak labor demand, and this negative correlation intends to overstate the casual effects of
the UI benefits on unemployment exit. The implied effects of UI expansions on the exit hazard,
which is computed as the difference between the average fitted exit probability and the average fitted
probability implied by the model with benefit durations set to 26 weeks for the entire sample, range
from -1.7 to -2.3 percentage points in 2010:Q4.
The second strategy uses a control group, which include unemployed workers not eligible
for UI, i.e. job-leavers, to control the state labor market conditions (This method is also used in
Valetta and Kuang, 2010; Farber and Valletta, 2011), without needing to control the effects of the




) = ωDist + eistθDist + Pn(nist, eist; γ) + eistPZ(Zst; δ) + αst, (10)
where eits is an indicator for whether the individual i is a job loser (UI-eligible), and αst is a full
set of state-month indicators.
However the proportion of job leavers who left their jobs voluntarily and hence are ineligible
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for the UI, was low during the recent recession, and usually the job leavers are composed by way
much more people who have better job opportunities than job losers who got laid off but are eligible
for the UI. Therefore, this strategy also can overstate the effect of UI benefits. In this specification,
the distinct effects on those unemployed more or less than 26 weeks are isolated as well, and the
negative effects are concentrated among individuals unemployed for more than 26 weeks.
The third strategy only focuses on the variation in EB, which purely replies on whether
states participate in the programs when the state unemployment rates reach the trigger. Since the
paper assumes that individuals do not anticipate future legislative changes of the EUC benefits, by
isolating the effects of EB, this strategy can remove the influences of the assumption to the estimates.
Moreover, the remaining variations should mainly come from states with similar economic situations.
Besides, under these three strategies, Rothstein (2011) also uses multinomial logit model to explore
the distinction between reemployment and labor force exit. Benefit extensions appear to lead to
larger reductions in the probability of labor force exit than in the probability of reemployment.
The last strategy investigates the interaction between the number of available benefit weeks




) = f(dist; θ) + γv
99∑
v=0
1(nist = v) + αst, (11)
where dits represents the number of weeks of benefits remaining, with a flexible function f. The
summation term is a full set of indicators for unemployment durations ranging from 0 to 99 weeks.
As indicated in the job search model, this strategy captures the stronger effects of the extension
of UI benefit on individuals who will exhaust the benefits immediately and only get to add the
extension to the end, than on individuals who anticipate the extension at the beginning of the UI.
According to Rothstein (2011)’s results, the availability of extended UI benefits caused small
reductions in the probability that unemployed workers exited unemployment, reducing the monthly
hazard in the fourth quarter of 2010 by between one and three percentage points on a base of 22.4%.
Not more than half of the unemployment exit effect comes from effects on reemployment: one of
the specifications indicates that UI extensions reduced the average monthly reemployment hazard of
unemployed displaced workers in 2010:Q4 by 0.5 percentage points (on a base of 13.4%), and reduced
the monthly labor force exit hazard by 1.0 percentage points (on a base of 9.0%). Even the specifica-
tion yielding the largest effects indicates that UI extensions contributed only 0.5 percentage points to
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the unemployment rate. Moreover, simulations that include only the labor force participation effects
yield estimates at least half as large as do simulations with both participation and reemployment
effects, suggesting that reduced job search due to UI extensions raised the unemployment rate by
only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.
Farber and Valletta (2013) uses the rotation group of the Current Population Survey from
January 2000 to December 2005 (2000m1-2005m12) and from January 2007 to December 2012
(2007m1-2012m12) to examine the effects of the two episodes of extended benefits in the 2000s.
Using the matched individuals for four consecutive months produces a sample of longer un-
employment spells than the actual ones, and hence Farber and Valletta (2013) adopts a discrete-time
hazard specification to model the conditional probability that the unemployment spell ends at certain
duration. Assuming a standard normal distribution for the hazard probability, the corresponding
probit model has monthly observations on an unemployment spell matched to the succeeding month.
The paper also applies a competing risk model to analyze the transition out of unemployment to
new jobs, and exiting unemployment to leave the labor force.
To assess the impact of UI extensions, Farber and Valletta (2013) also compiled a detailed
database of trigger dates and maximum available UI weeks at the state level. The extension of UI
availability proceeded gradually, and its extent and timing varied across states. Instead of including
simulated available benefit weeks between the time of displacement and the initial CPS interviews,
this paper uses two dummy variables to capture the gradual extensions of UI: the indicator for
availability of extended benefits, EBit, and the indicator for whether individual i is in the last
month of availability of benefits, lastit.
yit = βXit + δ1EBit + δ2Lastit + εit, (12)
where the unobserved latent variable yit is positive if a spell ends in a given month. X vector
includes a set of standard personal characteristics and economic variables: a cubic in the monthly
seasonally adjusted state unemployment rate and a cubic in the 3-month annualized growth in
seasonally adjusted log non-farm payroll employment. The model also includes a set of indicators
for the unemployment durations. A complete set of date (year-month) and state indicators, which
provide additional controls for relative economic conditions, are also included.
Expected effect of extended UI for UI-ineligible group should be smaller than for UI eligible
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individuals. However, since the variables used in the model do not account for the effects of the
variation in economic conditions across states over time, which is correlated with the extension of
the UI, the estimates of the effect of extended UI on the UI-eligible group could be overstated. From
the other side, the spillover effects of extended UI on the job finding for the UI-ineligible group can
be implied as well.
To confirm the fact that based on the March CPS that only a small fraction of job leavers and
new entrants report having received UI, Farber and Valletta (2013) also does a placebo test which
reestimate the probit model of exit from unemployment on samples of UI ineligible unemployed
individuals. In principal, the UI-ineligible group should be largely unaffected by the availability of
extended benefits, and hence if the classification of UI-eligible and UI-ineligible groups is correct,
the re-estimated results should not be the same as before. If the re-estimated results have the
same negative signs as on the UI-eligible group, then the specification may not fully controlled the
state/month specific economic conditions and the estimates of the results on the UI-eligible group
can be overestimated the real effects. If the re-estimated results have the opposite positive signs
as on the UI-eligible group, i.e. a positive effect of extended benefits on exit from unemployment
among the UI-ineligible group, then this indicates that extended benefits reduce the job finding rate
among the UI-eligible while improving job opportunities for the UI-ineligible. This is called positive
externality in the old literature. The placebo test shows that there is no effect of the extension on
the UI-ineligible group in the earlier period while in the later period the availability of extended
benefits is correlated with unmeasured economic conditions.
Small but statistically significant effects of UI are found by Farber and Valletta (2013):
reduce the unemployment exits, increase the unemployment durations and the estimated expected
unemployment durations as well. During the recession, extended benefits increased the expected
duration of unemployment by about 7 percent but accounted for about 22 percent of long-term
unemployment in the cross-section. Yet this founding arises the conflict, because extended benefits
have only small effects on the distribution of unemployment duration early in spells(≥26 weeks),
and the substantial majority of spells end in the first 26 weeks. This paper also finds that the
effect on exit from unemployment occurs primarily through a reduction in labor force exits rather
than through exit to employment, which implies that extended benefits do not delay the time to re-
employment substantially and the major effect of extended benefits is providing income to job losers
who would have exited the labor force otherwise. Overall, this paper estimate that extended UI
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increased the whole unemployment rate by only about 0.4 percentage points in the recent recession,
which is small in comparison with the peak unemployment rate of 10 percent.
Fujita (2011) uses the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data to estimate the
transition rates from unemployment to employment (UE) and from unemployment to leaving labor
force (UN). This paper only focuses on male workers as in Moffitt (1985), Meyer (1990) and Katz and
Meyer (1990) given that women are often secondary earners in a household, which may complicate
the interpretation of the results. This paper distinguishes the exit rates between job finding and
dropping out of the labor force. The CPS data is used for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
official labor market statistics rates such as the unemployment rate, and hence it is easily to be
translated the effects on transition rates into the unemployment rate. The sample covers the period
between January 2004 and July 2010, excluding the observations for 2008. The data prior to 2008
are used to infer the shape of the hazard functions when no UI benefits are available beyond 26
weeks, whereas the post-2008 data are used to estimate the hazard functions during the period of
large extensions. Since the first extension in response to the Great Recession is introduced in the
middle of 2008, by excluding the 2008 data, it is easily to contrast the shapes of the hazard functions
between the period with and without extensions.
Fujita (2011) uses a multinomial logit regression model. Let Si be the labor market status







where function yi is defined as follow:
yi = αsXi + βsDi + EB∆sDi + ηsvt (14)
The vector Xi represents time-invariant individual characteristics. The variable Di is a vector of
dummy variables, indicating which unemployment duration bin the worker is in. A dummy variable
EB takes 1 when extended benefits are available and 0 otherwise. In other words, if a worker is
unemployed during the 2009-2010 period, then EB=1 and 0 otherwise. vt represents the job vacancy
rate in month t measured in the JOLTS, and this variable serves to control for the differences in
the business cycle conditions. The assumption that implied in this model is that job vacancies are
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exogenous to other variables, which is not true because the number of job seekers (which is affected
by the generosity of benefits) influences the vacancy creation. Therefore, the estimated effect of the
UI extension on the hazard rates is smaller than the actual one. Fujita (2011) finds that UI benefit
extensions have raised the male unemployment rate by around 1.2 percentage points.
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Appendix B Proofs of the model in Rothstein (2011)
An unemployed individual’s income is y0 if she does not receive UI benefits and y0 + b
otherwise. Her utility is u(c) − s, where c is the consumption and s is the amount of effort she
devotes to research. If she finds a job, the utility becomes u(w), where w is wage assumed as
exogenous permanent. The probability that she finds a job is a increasing function of search effort,
p(s), with p
′
(s) > 0, p
′′
(s) < 0, p(0) = 0, p
′
(0) =∞, and p(s) < 1 for all s. Unemployment benefits
are available for up to D periods of unemployment. These assumptions lead to a dynamic decision
problem corresponding to the number of weeks of benefits remaining. Letting VU (d) represent the
value function of an unemployed individual with d > 0 weeks of benefits remaining, VE represents
the value function of an employed worker, the Bellman equation is
VU (d) = max
sd
u(y0 + b)− sd + δ[p(sd)VE + (1− p(sd))VU (d− 1)], (15)
where sd represents the chosen search effort, and δ is the per-week discount rate. Once benefits are
exhausted (d = 0), the problem becomes stationary:
VU (0) = max
s0
u(y0)− s0 + δ[p(s0)VE + (1− p(s0))VU (0)], (16)
The first order condition of equation (1) then implies that the search effort choice satisfies:
p′(sd) =
1
δ(VE − VU (d− 1))
(17)
for d ≥ 1. From equation (34), two main results are found.
Proposition 1: The value function VU (d) is increasing in d
From equation (32) and (33), we know that the maximization problem is identical when




δ(VE − VU (0))
(18)
Thus, s0 = s1 and VU (1) > VU (0). The optimal s is denoted as sd given d weeks of benefits
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remaining. Assume that Vu(x) > Vu(x− 1) for some x > 0, then
VU (x+ 1)− VU (x) = VU (sx+1, x+ 1)− VU (sx, x)
≥ VU (sx, x+ 1)− VU (sx, x)
= δ(1− p(sx))(Vu(x)− Vu(x− 1)) (19)
Hence, VU (d+ 1) > VU (d) for all d, and the first proposition can be proved
Proposition 2: Search effort increases as exhaustion approaches, reaching its final level in
the second to the last period of benefit receipt: sd+1 < sd < s1 = s0 for all d ≥ 2.
Equation (34) implies that the p′(sd+1) > p
′(sd) when VU (d+ 1) > VU (d). Since p
′′ < 0 as
assumed, sd+1 < sd.
The first two propositions show that as approaching to the UI benefit expiration, search
intensity rises, and individuals who are running out of their benefits exert higher search efforts than
individuals who are at the beginning of their unemployment spell and still having a lot of benefit
available. Hence, the extension of the insurance benefit will reduce the search efforts for people
who would have invested more efforts on job searching as approaching to the end of the benefits,
and reduce the probability of exiting from UI to jobs. The magnitude of this reduction effects on
individuals depends of the shape of the p() function.
Besides, the paper assumes that only if unemployed workers continue job search and exert
search effort higher than certain given level θ > 0, they will receive the same amount insurance
benefit across limited time. For those who exert lower search effort, they receive 0 benefit payment,
but preserve their benefit entitlements in the future. The Bellman equation becomes:
ṼU (d) = max
sd

u(y0 + b)− s+ δ[p(s)VE + (1− p(s))ṼU (d− 1)] if s ≥ θ
u(y0)− s+ δ[p(s)VE + (1− p(s))ṼU (d)] if s < θ.
(20)
The second main finding based on the assumption above is that the extension of the unem-
ployment benefit continues the unemployed workers search intensity, which could potentially increase
the probability of finding a job. Combining the two findings, the net effect on the probability of
exiting from UI to jobs is ambiguous.
Proposition 3: Any individual who chooses search effort s ≥ θ with d weeks of benefits
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remaining would also choose s ≥ θ with d′ weeks remaining, for all d, d′ > 0
In order to prove Proposition 3, Rothstein (2011) lets η to indicate whether the optimal
search effort s̃d is bigger than the threshold θ at d, ηd = ηd−1 = ... = η0, and ηd+1 6= ηd for any
d > 0, and shows contradictions by this setting in two cases. The first case is when ηd = 1(s̃d ≥ θ),
so the individual receives the benefit for all x ≤ d. Thus s̃1 = s̃0, s̃x+1 < s̃x, and Ṽx+1 > Ṽx for all
x > 0. By the assumption ηd+1 6= ηd, the ηd+1 must be equal to 0, and the s̃x+1 < θ. Then equation
(37) becomes
ṼU (d+ 1) = max
sd+1<θ
u(y0)− sd+1 + δ[p(sd+1)VE + (1− p(sd+1))ṼU (d+ 1)]
= max
sd+1<θ
u(y0)− sd+1 + δp(sd+1)VE
1− δ[1− p(sd+1)]
(21)
ṼU (d) = max
sd≥θ
u(y0 + b)− sd + δ[p(sd)VE + (1− p(sd))ṼU (d− 1)] (22)
Equation (38) implies that the right-hand side does not vary with the period. In another word,
ṼU (sd+1, d+ 1) = ṼU (sd+1, d). However, ṼU (sd+1, d+ 1) > ṼU (sd, d) > ṼU (sd+1, d) yields a contra-
diction.
The second case when ηd = ηd−1 = ... = η0 = 0, but ηd+1 = 1. So the individual receives
the benefit only at d + 1. Since s̃d+1 < s̃d, and s̃d+1 > θ, the s̃d must be bigger than θ, which
contradicts to the assumption too.
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Appendix C Other discrete-time hazard analysis
Other than the logit model, in this section I present alternative duration models to check
the robustness of results from logit models. The first hazard model I use is the complementary
log-log model 16. Unlike the logit model, which assumes that the hazard rate is symmetric around
0.5, the complementary log-log model fits the data which do not support symmetric exit rates in
the [0, 1] interval, but have the rates increasing sharply at small to moderate value but increases
slowly near 1. Relative to the assumption that the hazard rates have a logistic distribution, the
assumption of the hazard rate distribution of the complementary log-log model is more suitable for
the UI study because the probability of leaving unemployment occurs much less frequently than the
event of ending benefit weeks without being covered by employment. The complementary log-log
has the form:
log(−log(1− λ(Xit))) = X
′
itβ, (23)
where λ(Xit) is the exit hazard for jobs, and Xit include all the regressors I used in the specification
(1.1) and with the same form.
The other approach I used to exam the effects of extension is Cox-proportional hazard
model. The time at risk has a range from t = 0 (zero benefit weeks) to t = 99 (the maximum 99
benefit weeks). The hazard rate function for each observation i at time t is assumed to take the
form:
hi(t) = λ0(t) exp(X
′
i(t)β), (24)
where Xi(t) is a vector of covariates summarizing observed differences between individuals at t.
λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function which are the time intervals at risk of the event (exiting for
jobs) occurring for each person, and may take a parametric or non-parametric form. In this study,
I use a non-parametric form for the baseline hazard function by defining 100 dummy variables, and
each one represents the number of benefit weeks at risk of leaving UI for new jobs.
The interpretation of the coefficients can be easily translated into the elasticities of exit
hazards with respect to other regressors, and this will facilitate me to compare my results with
the previous literature 17. One advantage of generic proportional hazard model is that the base-
16See Powers and Xie (2000)
17When the exist hazards are very small, both of the estimates of the complementary log-log model and the logit
80
line hazard function can be estimated non-parametrically, as I used in the logit model. Different
specifications of the baseline hazard function can vary the estimates largely. Non-parametrically
estimating the baseline hazard avoids inconsistent estimation of covariate coefficients due to a mis-
specified baseline hazard 18. The main advantage of Cox-proportional model is that the baseline
hazard has “canceled out” in the partial likelihood shown below, and hence the specification of
baseline hazards does not affect the estimates.
To simplify, all intervals are assumed to be of unit length, and hence the recorded duration
for each person i corresponds to the interval [ti − 1, ti). Given the proportional hazard assumption,
the probability that an unemployment spell does not end before time ti−1 can be represented as the
survivor function, which at the time interval [ti − 1, ti) has the form:
Pr(T ≥ ti − 1) = S(ti − 1;Xit) = exp{−exp[(X
′
itβ) + ln(Λti−1)]}, (25)
where Λti−1 =
∑ti
s=0 hs. The corresponding discrete time hazard in the interval, which describes
the probability that a spell ends between ti − 1 and ti, given that spell has survived to ti − 1:










In my study, the binary dependent variable is whether UI claimants leaving UI for jobs
yi = 1, or otherwise yi = 0. The former group contributes completed spell data, while the latter
group contributes right-censored spell data. With these assumptions, the log-likelihood logL(β,Λ)






























ln [1− hs(Xit)]} (27)
model can also be interpreted as the elasticity of exit hazards with respect to other regressor.
18Due to the limited computational time, I only use 20% of my data to get results from the nonparametric analysis.
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Maximizing this log-likelihood with respect to β by plugging the equation (24) in, I can get
the estimate β, and the baseline hazard cancels out. This log likelihood function (27) can be written
as a function of a binary dependent variable yit with value of 1 if individual i ends benefit spell with
a job covered, and 0 otherwise.
One main concern in the hazard analysis is the unobserved heterogeneity that induces an
underestimate of the extent to which the exit hazard rate increases with duration. (i.e. over-
estimate of the decline in the exit hazards as the unemployment duration raising), and attenuates
the magnitude of the impact of covariates on the hazard rates 19. A common way to capture
the unobserved heterogeneity between individuals is to incorporate a Gamma distributed random





itβ + ln(εi)) (28)
where εi is a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and variance σ
2. The discrete-time
hazard function is now:
hit = 1− exp{−exp[(X ′itβ) + ln(Λt) + ln(εi)]} (29)
Alternatively, the unobserved heterogeneity can also be treated non-parametrically. Heck-
man and Singer (1984) develop a consistent nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator for the
distribution of unobservables, by allowing for an arbitrary distribution for the individual heterogene-
ity term. This is reflected in the hazard function incorporating an extra term allowing for different
intercepts for people with different unobserved characteristics. In my specification, I assume that
there are two general types (type=1, 2) people including in the data, then the hazard will be
hit = 1− exp{−exp[mj +X
′
itβ + ln(ht)]}, j ∈ 1, 2 (30)
where mj represents the discrete points of a bivariate variable. The probability that an individual
is of of type 1 (2) is P1 (P2 = 1− P1), and contribute m1 (m2) to the hazard rates. The predicted
19Another reason to choose the non-parametric form of the baseline hazard function is that parametric models which
tightly constrain the general shape of the baseline hazard, for instance Weibull, when in fact the pattern of data may
be non-monotonic, and hence could bias the estimates of the duration dependence. Moreover it is well-known that
”the significance of unobserved heterogeneity are more reliably drawn if a flexible specification for the baseline hazard
has been used”.
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Table 5 presents the estimated results for the complementary log-log model without con-
sidering any potential unobserved heterogeneity, for the Cox - proportional hazard model treating
unobserved heterogeneity non-parametrically, for the Cox - proportional hazard model assuming a
Gamma distribution for unobserved heterogeneity. In both of the proportional hazard models, I
treat the baseline hazard non-parametrically by creating 100 interval-specific dummy variables (one
for each spell week at risk), as the longest observed spell in my data set is 99 weeks and the shortest
benefit week is 0.
Comparing across the three models, it can be observed that the three estimates give quite
similar results. For the non-parametric model, I assume that there are two types people. As indicated
in the results, the probability of being type 1 is insignificantly different from the probability of being
type 2. (i.e. P-value of the difference of being two different people is 0.802) According to this, I fail
to reject the null hypothesis that the type 1 is no different from the type 2, and can conclude that
there is no unobserved individual heterogeneity. For the model assuming the Gamma distribution,
the null hypothesis is that unobserved heterogeneity variance component is equal to zero, namely
the unobserved heterogeneity does not exist. According to the test statistics, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis, and hence I conclude that there is no heterogeneity issue in this model as well.
As indicated in Table 5, the significant negative effects of the indicator for whether individ-
uals are at their last week of UI benefit show that individuals who have more than one benefit weeks
available have much lower possibilities to exit UI for jobs. As the remaining benefit weeks increasing,
the probability of exiting UI decreases, yet the effects are insignificant. The base group is defined
as non-white female who are younger than 22 years old, high school drop outs, and used to work
in agriculture sector. The coefficient estimate gives the change in the exit hazards when a discrete
change from a base category occurs. For example, relative to other races, white workers have lower
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Table 5: Use Alternative Hazard Models to estimate the effect of extensions to UI
duration
Variables Complementary Cox Proportional Hazard
log-log Non-para Heter Gamma Dist. Heter
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
I(Remaining benefit>0) -0.56664 0.05530 -0.58738 0.05735 -0.59539 0.05712
# Remaining benefit wks -0.00063 0.00127 -0.00103 0.00131 -0.00116 0.00131
male 0.11687 0.01850 0.12267 0.01970 0.12464 0.02023
white -0.04022 0.02503 -0.04216 0.02641 -0.04549 0.02722
Age
22-31 -0.28114 0.02711 -0.29741 -0.03062 -0.30566 0.03133
32-41 -0.36054 0.02828 -0.38362 0.03366 -0.39547 0.03425
42-51 -0.47202 0.02871 -0.49996 0.03557 -0.51480 0.03622
52-62 -0.73102 0.03416 -0.76824 0.04329 -0.78748 0.04401
>63 -1.19689 0.06632 -1.25070 0.07678 -1.27908 0.07811
Years of Education
9 0.04709 0.02000 0.04651 0.02098 0.04534 0.02157
12 -0.01805 0.05474 -0.02642 0.05744 -0.03070 0.05900
16 0.05510 0.04354 0.05521 0.04559 0.05539 0.04690
20 0.05499 0.02621 0.05457 0.02745 0.05360 0.02823
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Variables Complementary Cox Proportional Hazard
log-log Non-para Heter Gamma Dist. Heter
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Industry
Mining 0.19515 0.07572 0.20093 0.07928 0.20559 0.08154
Utilities -0.18839 0.37993 -0.22579 0.39478 -0.21980 0.40257
Construction 0.34499 0.04347 0.34924 0.04543 0.35217 0.04670
Manufacturing 0.36557 0.04211 0.38204 0.04530 0.39045 0.04639
Wholesale Trade 0.10857 0.05594 0.10476 0.05838 0.10423 0.05994
Retail Trade -0.01056 0.04648 -0.01612 0.04854 -0.01768 0.04979
Transportation and Warehousing 0.25999 0.05093 0.26812 0.05354 0.27320 0.05509
Information -0.00455 0.07840 -0.01339 0.08176 -0.01647 0.08387
Finance and Insurance -0.01022 0.06850 -0.02101 0.07155 -0.02551 0.07335
Real Estate/Rental and Leasing 0.00026 0.08388 -0.00652 0.08729 -0.00873 0.08957
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.10832 0.05256 0.10031 0.05501 0.09768 0.05639
Management of Companies and Enterprises 0.15759 0.14321 0.16285 0.14990 0.16670 0.15399
Administrative-Support 0.20568 0.04019 0.21044 0.04203 0.21427 0.04322
Educational Services -0.03642 0.12015 -0.04354 0.12469 -0.04657 0.12788
Health Care 0.23830 0.04650 0.24533 0.04877 0.25040 0.05020
Arts-Entertainment 0.29399 0.07173 0.30529 0.07555 0.31133 0.07770
Accom.-Food Services 0.25678 0.04241 0.26769 0.04497 0.27436 0.04623
Other Services 0.19897 0.05003 0.20209 0.05227 0.20506 0.05376
Public Administration 0.05365 0.19586 0.05303 0.20381 0.05362 0.20927
Constant -16.79126 527.06250 -16.72912 0.19121 -16.56403 0.22206
# of Claims 117,504 117,504 117,504
P(type 1)=.3481642 LR test of Gamma var=0
P(type 2)=.6518358 chibar2(01)=5.58312
P-value(diff)=0.802 Prob.>=chibar2=0.9067
Note: In these specifications, I control for the individual-level covariates, fixed time effects for calendar month, three-
order polynomial insured unemployment rates, three-order polynomial new UI claims rates, and baseline hazard.
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hazard rates according to the negative estimates from three models. Male unemployed individuals
have higher exit hazards than female benefit claimants. With respect to educational attainment,
more education often associated with higher job finding rates: relative to individuals whose educa-
tion levels are lower than high school, more educated workers are more likely to reemployed, and
have significant positive estimates. Relative to individuals who are less than 252 people with higher
ages are more difficult to leave UI for jobs. This result may reflect the differences in the type of
jobs typically associated with each age group, but this finding is also consistent with the findings
from previous literature showing that younger workers have higher labor turnover in general, which
means the problem of jobs for the young is not that they are hard to find, but that they do not last
very long. The findings are quite consistent with the results of the logit model.
From the predicted hazard demonstrated in Table 6, we can see the diminishing exit hazards
as individuals unemployment duration increasing. The highest predicted probability of leaving UI for
jobs happens at the end of the state UI, i.e. with benefit weeks of 26 weeks, and longer unemployment
durations reduce the possibilities of finding jobs. But when people are about to exhaust their total
benefit and getting closer to the end of 99 benefit weeks, the predicted exiting hazards raise.
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Table 6: Predicted Hazard Rates From Survival Models
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
log-log Cox- nonpara Cox - Gamma Distr log-log Cox- nonpara Cox - Gamma Distr
Hazard SE Hazard SE Hazard SE Hazard SE Hazard SE Hazard SE
0 wk 0.27996 0.00000 0.18736 0.00000 0.29104 0.00000 50 wk 0.02346 0.25689 0.02406 0.27303 0.02830 0.27894
1 wk 0.07669 0.00289 0.05195 0.05110 0.08106 0.01512 51 wk 0.00798 0.23160 0.00820 0.21959 0.00966 0.20835
2 wk 0.12027 0.00002 0.08430 0.00287 0.12762 0.00035 52 wk 0.03486 0.13357 0.03582 0.15378 0.04211 0.16606
3 wk 0.06397 0.01050 0.04552 0.08230 0.06835 0.03661 53 wk 0.01382 0.31211 0.01423 0.30912 0.01675 0.30152
4 wk 0.12908 0.00001 0.09521 0.00096 0.13831 0.00013 54 wk 0.01402 0.31342 0.01444 0.31092 0.01700 0.30352
5 wk 0.06066 0.01447 0.04542 0.08225 0.06553 0.04380 55 wk 0.01002 0.27634 0.01032 0.26671 0.01216 0.25547
6 wk 0.10455 0.00013 0.08043 0.00410 0.11324 0.00118 56 wk 0.03160 0.16694 0.03259 0.18634 0.03830 0.19825
7 wk 0.05331 0.02870 0.04155 0.10717 0.05812 0.06963 57 wk 0.02055 0.28942 0.02123 0.29984 0.02498 0.30208
8 wk 0.08058 0.00192 0.06402 0.01831 0.08805 0.00875 58 wk 0.02506 0.24172 0.02592 0.25756 0.03048 0.26532
9 wk 0.05139 0.03409 0.04134 0.10819 0.05644 0.07671 59 wk 0.02064 0.28876 0.02137 0.29894 0.02514 0.30131
10 wk 0.09290 0.00050 0.07627 0.00600 0.10219 0.00288 60 wk 0.01534 0.31919 0.01590 0.31970 0.01871 0.31402
11 wk 0.04961 0.03989 0.04120 0.10864 0.05491 0.08360 61 wk 0.00940 0.27026 0.00975 0.26096 0.01149 0.24924
12 wk 0.07468 0.00357 0.06298 0.01984 0.08281 0.01283 62 wk 0.01263 0.31206 0.01310 0.30737 0.01543 0.29813
13 wk 0.05130 0.03444 0.04373 0.09093 0.05715 0.07288 63 wk 0.00808 0.24376 0.00839 0.23346 0.00988 0.22162
14 wk 0.05980 0.01577 0.05157 0.05065 0.06678 0.03946 64 wk 0.02732 0.21710 0.02837 0.23337 0.03337 0.24297
15 wk 0.04910 0.04176 0.04275 0.09701 0.05503 0.08247 65 wk 0.02090 0.28915 0.02175 0.29891 0.02560 0.30157
16 wk 0.06485 0.00967 0.05711 0.03232 0.07282 0.02610 66 wk 0.01148 0.30361 0.01196 0.29760 0.01408 0.28704
17 wk 0.04239 0.07305 0.03763 0.13556 0.04779 0.12336 67 wk 0.01164 0.30618 0.01213 0.30042 0.01429 0.28998
18 wk 0.07738 0.00270 0.06954 0.01097 0.08731 0.00908 68 wk 0.01843 0.31117 0.01919 0.31710 0.02259 0.31620
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
log-log Cox- nonpara Cox - Gamma Distr log-log Cox- nonpara Cox - Gamma Distr
19 wk 0.04480 0.06019 0.04061 0.11155 0.05083 0.10435 69 wk 0.01553 0.32460 0.01617 0.32547 0.01904 0.32008
20 wk 0.06733 0.00758 0.06164 0.02192 0.07650 0.02002 70 wk 0.00706 0.22189 0.00736 0.21223 0.00866 0.20043
21 wk 0.04972 0.03971 0.04589 0.07691 0.05674 0.07390 71 wk 0.01952 0.30525 0.02036 0.31270 0.02396 0.31355
22 wk 0.07082 0.00533 0.06599 0.01496 0.08094 0.01449 72 wk 0.01807 0.31678 0.01887 0.32191 0.02221 0.32055
23 wk 0.04769 0.04740 0.04476 0.08330 0.05477 0.08295 73 wk 0.01294 0.32275 0.01352 0.31924 0.01591 0.31011
24 wk 0.06777 0.00727 0.06412 0.01759 0.07793 0.01798 74 wk 0.01486 0.32874 0.01552 0.32847 0.01827 0.32203
25 wk 0.04816 0.04559 0.04586 0.07677 0.05563 0.07869 75 wk 0.01883 0.31329 0.01969 0.31944 0.02317 0.31932
26 wk 0.27133 0.00000 0.26484 0.00000 0.30948 0.00000 76 wk 0.00775 0.24583 0.00811 0.23683 0.00955 0.22449
27 wk 0.01209 0.28533 0.01198 0.27461 0.01427 0.26748 77 wk 0.01366 0.32929 0.01430 0.32710 0.01684 0.31897
28 wk 0.03233 0.15493 0.03209 0.18733 0.03811 0.19610 78 wk 0.01777 0.32282 0.01863 0.32722 0.02193 0.32544
29 wk 0.01338 0.29594 0.01330 0.28931 0.01581 0.28288 79 wk 0.11139 0.00006 0.11673 0.00010 0.13622 0.00015
30 wk 0.02594 0.22401 0.02583 0.25110 0.03066 0.25716 80 wk 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
31 wk 0.01368 0.29821 0.01364 0.29272 0.01620 0.28639 81 wk 0.01475 0.34602 0.01556 0.34590 0.01836 0.33937
32 wk 0.02365 0.24918 0.02363 0.27167 0.02801 0.27615 82 wk 0.00503 0.17666 0.00531 0.16952 0.00622 0.15800
33 wk 0.01807 0.29614 0.01807 0.30443 0.02143 0.30283 83 wk 0.01520 0.34777 0.01605 0.34826 0.01896 0.34249
34 wk 0.02329 0.25340 0.02333 0.27458 0.02764 0.27889 84 wk 0.01036 0.31971 0.01095 0.31421 0.01294 0.30257
35 wk 0.02054 0.27976 0.02061 0.29455 0.02440 0.29598 85 wk 0.01800 0.33585 0.01903 0.33994 0.02250 0.33842
36 wk 0.02288 0.25812 0.02300 0.27773 0.02721 0.28190 86 wk 0.01039 0.32038 0.01099 0.31513 0.01300 0.30367
37 wk 0.01582 0.30453 0.01593 0.30592 0.01884 0.30148 87 wk 0.01053 0.32347 0.01114 0.31838 0.01318 0.30716
38 wk 0.02778 0.20498 0.02802 0.23029 0.03309 0.23898 88 wk 0.01609 0.34939 0.01704 0.35110 0.02016 0.34673
39 wk 0.01785 0.29843 0.01805 0.30542 0.02133 0.30349 89 wk 0.02988 0.19845 0.03166 0.20909 0.03744 0.21900
40 wk 0.03273 0.15227 0.03318 0.17754 0.03912 0.18858 90 wk 0.01404 0.35539 0.01490 0.35468 0.01764 0.34737
41 wk 0.02237 0.26477 0.02271 0.28140 0.02679 0.28544 91 wk 0.01730 0.34818 0.01837 0.35122 0.02175 0.34872
42 wk 0.02261 0.26259 0.02299 0.27936 0.02710 0.28377 92 wk 0.01458 0.35874 0.01549 0.35872 0.01835 0.35221
43 wk 0.00810 0.22837 0.00825 0.21513 0.00973 0.20452 93 wk 0.01783 0.34652 0.01895 0.35008 0.02246 0.34837
44 wk 0.03027 0.17859 0.03084 0.20195 0.03630 0.21284 94 wk 0.00617 0.23149 0.00657 0.22553 0.00772 0.21245
45 wk 0.01565 0.30917 0.01596 0.31020 0.01881 0.30521 95 wk 0.01555 0.36234 0.01652 0.36342 0.01958 0.35837
46 wk 0.03410 0.13989 0.03482 0.16249 0.04093 0.17469 96 wk 0.00327 0.11924 0.00348 0.11486 0.00412 0.10799
47 wk 0.00636 0.18610 0.00650 0.17341 0.00766 0.16335 97 wk 0.02046 0.33025 0.02175 0.33614 0.02578 0.33825
48 wk 0.03157 0.16571 0.03228 0.18803 0.03796 0.19971 98 wk 0.03540 0.14177 0.03762 0.15104 0.04459 0.16110
49 wk 0.01294 0.30475 0.01326 0.29955 0.01562 0.29096 99 wk 0.14340 0.00000 0.15136 0.00000 0.17756 0.00000
88
Bibliography
Card, D., Johnston, A., Leung, P., Mas, A., and Pei, Z. (2015). The effect of unemployment benefits
on the duration of unemployment insurance receipt: New evidence from a regression kink design
in missouri, 2003-2013. American Economic Review, 105:126–30.
Card, D., Lee, D., Pei, Z., and Weber, A. (2012). Nonlinear policy rules and the identification and
estimation of causal effects in a generalized regression kink design. NBER Working Papers.
Card, D. and Levine, P. B. (2000). Extended benefits and the duration of ui spells: evidence from
the new jersey extended benefit program. Journal of Public Economics, 78:107–138.
Chetty, R. (2008). Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance. Journal of
Political Economy, 116:173–234.
Fan, J. and Gijbels, I. (1992). Variable bandwidth and local linear regression smoothers. The Annals
of Statistics, 20(4):2008–2036.
Farber, H. S. and Valletta, R. G. (2013). Do extended unemployment benefits lengthen unemploy-
ment spells? evidence from recent cycles in the u.s. labor market. NBER Working Papers.
Florens, J.-P., Heckman, J. J., Meghir, C., and Vytlacil, E. J. (2008). Identification of treatment
effects using control functions in models with continuous, endogenous treatment and heterogeneous
effects. Econometrica, Econometric Society pages, 76(5):1191 – 1206.
Fujita, S. (2011). Effects of extended unemployment insurance benefits: evidence from the monthly
cps. Working paper.
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984). A method for minimizing the impact of distributional assump-
tions in econometric models for duration data. Econometrica, 52(2):271–320.
Imbens, G. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression discontinuity
estimator. The Review of Economic Studies. The Review of Economic Studies. The Review of
Economic Studies, 79:933–959.
Katz, L. F. and Meyer, B. D. (1990). The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits
on the duration of unemployment. Journal of Public Economics, 41:45–72.
Kroft, K. and Notowidigdo, M. J. (2011). Should unemployment insurance vary with the unemploy-
ment rate? theory and evidence. NBER Working Papers.
Landais, C. (2013). Assessing the welfare effects of unemployment benefits using the regression kink
design. IZA Discussion Papers.
Lee, D. S. and Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal of
Economic Literature, American Economic Association, 48(2):281–355.
89
Meyer, B. D. (1990). Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells. Econometrica, 58:757–82.
Mitman, K. and Rabinovich, S. (2015). Optimal unemployment insurance in an equilibrium business-
cycle model. Journal of Monetary Economics, 71(99-118).
Moffitt, R. (1985). Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells. Journal
of econometrics, 28:85–101.
Mortensen, D. T. (1977). Unemployment insurance and labor supply decisions. Discussion Papers.
Nielsen, H. S., Sorensen, T., and Taber, C. R. (2010). Estimating the effect of student aid on college
enrollmentestimating the effect of student aid on college enrollment: Evidence from a govern-
ment grant policy reform. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic
Association, 2(2):185–215.
Powers, D. A. and Xie, Y. (2000). Statistical Methods for Categorical Data Analysis. San Diego:
Academic Press.
Rothstein, J. (2011). Unemployment insurance and job search in the great recession. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, 43(2
(Fall)):143–213.
Schmieder, J. F., von Wachter, T., and Bender, S. (2012). The effects of extended unemployment
insurance over the business cycle: Evidence from regression discontinuity estimates over twenty
years. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2):701–742.
Simonsen, M., Skipper, L., and Skipper, N. (2010). Price sensitivity of demand for prescription
drugs: Exploiting a regression kink design. Economics Working Papers.
90
